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METAPHYSICS
The obJeot ot this paP!1J" 1s to

JOItl . . R07co'a aoaoap-

p" •• ent

tion 01' tbe bWl'lt'Il a.lt In bi8 metapbJa1cnl tralllbwoPk.
Ot;st, then, to beS1ft
1n.ot~

b7 sl"lac a orler aketch

.a 1t pertalna to tn. n~n a.lt.

to. 1"8t.....lna

app.roprla"

ROJoe olt:ar17 conO.1V68
_~'!.

!!. eigalka.

rna

.r

Me _tapbJal0.,

wor4

to hOJoe'. philo.o,*,"

~t~eb(alc.

Royce' a attitude than the

1.

ot belq, 81noa

ot be1n8 a. ao_t.b.1na })elond

!!Ct.~~ePlalc.,

It would bo

the pb7alcal,

toen, •••18 aore in kt,.plng wIth

lION

~Jlto10fl.

neutral word.

H.·.over,

HOJo.hi.elt trOlil tIme to t1. . appllf;a tn. word .,-tae&a108 to hia
cloctpine.

I.t
18 meant

tl:UAs 1. a a14 to bet real, exlatlna,

&

br

&0118

notion 01' wbat

expllclt.

the ten belal ought to be made

Ia4eea,

.t&,*-o.t. about ,..a1 tb.lnp wl11 be 81pItlcan' 1n proportIon to
tbe 'Vl"ldnes. 01' nne'. oonceptlon

ot being.

fhWl, 1t 1s bJ no

meau otloN to begin thle con.lderatlon ot tb8 hwar1 .elt PJ aaJ-

1Il8 that 1t ia a betlna.
tile

ott•• ,

1114" •• , tor olear

be . .ked what 1.

be1aJl tor

~lnEb

1t muat Ftt

HOT.e?

The hi.t01'7 of phllo.opiq' aholl. tilat men have bad difitmetrl-

0"113' oppose. BotioQII ot ,,11&t
.OM such notlona

*,

It

.~an.

to be.

Ii

DI'I.t look Itt

lir1na to 11ght the divergenc1es.

1

Paul

2
'1'illich apeaks ot being a,8 fin eatNmgement i'roJU God

sln.

!!!

,flU;;,

so,

ns

--

ThoMa AquinA • • p~)nksor being as a good in itself (omne ena

.b.o.num
__

>.

Immanuel Kant formally exclude. being from his .ystem,

fmd Benedetto Croce coes

80

incldental17.

Bemal:'d Lonergan, S.J.

stresses the iaomorph.1am bet.en being and mind.

};.{fOrtin Heidegger,

1n hi8 hermeneutio phenomenology, turns to tempornllt7 ... const1tutl.8 ot being Itself.

8ren Klekegaard s.es true being 01111 in

the light ot the super-rational, and Wl1liam Ja.mes •••• being 01'117

1n the world

or

natural practical1t7.

ROTce tullJ appreoiate. that belng, as 1e evidenced in historT, 1s not the • • •
~ent

rcr

all.

He s ••s thB. t a.n,- .antng1'ul state-

about the human .al1' demands both a oonslderation of the his-

torIcal meaninga

.ppll~d

to the term being and an unambiguous in-

dication of one'. own mean1n& tor

tn.

ter••

I shall dw.ll upon the nature ot Beina, bacauae to
assert that God ls, or that the World i,., or eyen,
with D.scartea, that I au1, implie,. that OIle knowa what
it i,. to be. or In oth~r worda. what t~ ao-oalle4
exlstential predicate itaelt Involve ••
A.

!!!! ~

Conoeetlona

.2!

Bel!J

The various notlons ot belng are oonsidered b7 Horee under
tour tTpea ot whleh be rejeots the .fIrst thre. and aocepts the last

aa hi. own. nthe

FoUl'~b.

Conception or Belng."

Our purpose heN 1.

not to detend or to condemn R01ce 'e presentation ot the various

schools ot ontology or to substantiate or to nullitJ hi. reaaona

lJoalah ROJce. The World and the Individual, Vol. I {New York
Dover PublIcations, !ric. I959).-p7 12:

3
ror rejection.

What is needed now is to present his arg\.Ul'ents

priefl1 so as to arrive at his conception of being, which is delin~at6d

by his rejections of the first three conceptions.

Before we

consider Roycets handling of each type of ontology, it would be
good to see how Royce lines them up with one anotherl
But .first let me name all the four. The mere
list will not be very enlightening, but it will serve
to fUrnish titles for our Immediatel, subsequ.nt Inquiries. The first conception I shall call the teohnics.ll7 RealistIc definition of what it 1s to be. The
second I shall call the Mystica.l conception. The third
I cannot so easi17 name. I shall sometimes call it the
typical view of modern Critical Rationalism. Just now
I prefer to name it by its foraulatIon, the conception
of the real as the Truth. or. in the present day, usually, as the EmpirIcally verifiable Truth. The fourth
I shall call the Synthetic, or the constructively Idealistic conception of whet it is to be. For the first
conception, that is real which is simpl1 Independent of
the mere ideas that relate or that ma.J' rere £8 to ii.
For this View, vrhat is, Is not only external to our
ideas of it, but absolutely and independentl1 decides
as to the validi t,. of such ideas. It controls or dete~nes the worth of ideas, and that wholly apart
from their or our desire or will. What we "merely
think" makes "no difference" to fact. For t he second
conoeption, that 1-s real which i. absolutely and
tinally IIml.edIate, so that when it is found, i.e.
felt, it altogetner end. any effort at ideal definition, and in this sense satisfies ideas as well as
constitutes the fact. For thIs view, therefore, Being
is the longed-for goal of our desire. For t he third
conception, that 1s real which is purely and s1mply
Valid or True. Abav e all, acoording to the modern
form of this View, that is real which Experience, in
verifying our ideas, shows to be valid about these
ideas. Or the real is the valid "Posaibili ty of Experience. II But for the fourth conception, that is
real which finally presents in a comple~ed ex~ rience
the whole meaning of a System of Ideas.~

-

2 Ibid ., pp. 60-61.

4
1.

Realism
The first type, the Realistic, places great stress on inde-

pendence as a c.riterion ror being.

A major d1atinction is vade,

according to this school, between the "that II of a being
Ii

what • ft

ImaginaIT beings ha ve a "what ft but no

If

tha t. tf

am

its

If a being

is independent of the idea (or concept) proper to it, then it has
a ftthatl\; it 1s real.

What a thing i8, then, does not signi.f7 that

it is.
Truth, 1'or the Realist, lies independent of man fa apprehension.

To get to it, man must e.oape from his mental contines.

To

get tc it, man must escape from his mental oonfines, which are imposed upon him

a.r

the nature of his inner life of consciousness.

The Realist conceives of a oleavage between the conceptual activ-

ity has no effect Whatsoever on the existential world.
Now the first of our tour conceptions of what it is
to be real, essentially declares that if you thus
know a real obJeot, and it thereupon your knowledge
vanishes from the world, that vanishIng ot your
knowledge mskes no dlffererloe, except by accident,
or Indi.rectly, to the real object that yeu know. 3
The real, according to this first concepti on of being, 1s a

given; it 1s not produced by any activity on man's .part.
the real Is not lImited just to what can be.ensed. for it

an Intelllgibilit1 whicb appears through senaible media.
18 grasped in ideas when those ideas escape
termination.

anr

Of course

mar

be

The real

subjectIve prede-

The aot
~elt

or

Motdlng itself js a rE>allt7, sinell it hela in it-

or

an Intellls101l1t1 whioh 1. Independent

~I!'trver

who vlew. the a..ot as an obJeot

or

a,~

extrinsl0 ob-

hia knowing.

Henoe the objeota of reallatio ontoloft7 are objects

or

not neoe.aarlly oui.alde

J! knovledse

wb.ate"er,

butt~l1 i~~~~~q~ 2!..!& • o~l!!1. ~ !!. externe:l
uem8t! ve ••
,
.ten rlnd it 8001&117 convenient to be .re.l~.ta. tot- then the,

-to

keep otber men and th1ng8, by ronalla ot ab8tt'"act oatogo!'l•• , 1n

~an

~n

order which 1- ln4ependent of theIr peraonal &lotions.

Thetr

polee in _oclety. then. aN aroitrary In tbf."t tho, can pcu.,tlo1pate
~.

the" will.

~aus.
~h18
~

it

The conservatlve m.nd 1. apt to accept reall_ be-

~.erve8

order in 8ooi6t,.

Ind••4,

tn.

realiat holda up

8001al order aa .. proof tor hl. ontologieal .,at.m, on whioh

tend. to take a poaltlon which perauades

ra.tl~r

tl».n demo.n-

.trat•••
"0108 f'incl. tile Roali. t
~OJll

'8

the known bard to accept.

~lchotOlQ'
~rad1.ct l

poa 1 tl on

()1'

InCie". hit

leola t1 nb ttlf:

.r•• la

know~r

that the atriot

between the l1lental and exlatel!t1al ord.r 1.nvolve. con-

ona.

It !J.eallar4l contradiots 1. ta own concept.i ,"18 1n
uttering til... It a ••erta t be DlUtual dependence or
imowlna and or Being In tt» vet'1 act 01' deolaring
Belna 1ndependent.)
,

In the exiatttnti.. 1 crder, •• erJ being which .xlatlll t" fin
~d1v!dual.

-

In the mental order, 8"8.1'1 ooncept 18 a unIveraal.

4I b14., p. 69.
SIbld., p. 76.

-

6

Once the Realist has made the two orders independent, he can never
have them united again.

"Its /Jfealism'illa:ws, as universals, con ..
tradict Its .facts, which have to be independent individuals." 6 The

abstract thinking of the Realist does not depict the real individual but, at best, gives some linkage ror systems or facts.

The ex-

istent, even for the Realist, is a noumenon, which is itself a concapt determined bY' a tb.1nking process.

Even tr..8,t which is con-

ceived as being totally independent of the mind is in .fact defined
by mind.

Royce teels that realism cannot claim to have real knowledge
ofaxistentia~

facts.

He says:

"Its

~ealIsm'!7

central technical

difficulty • • • is that wondrous proble. of the nature of individua1it,.. and as to the meaning of universals.ft.7

Further, that knowen

are independent from one another, Ro,'ce feels, is contradicted b7
experience.

"This L!fea1isti!7

vie~

of the social re1"lt ion • • •

is contradic ted b7 ever,.. case ot the communicati on of mind w:!.th
Independence here ~an8 that the knowers in knowing have
no ef'feet on one another. 9 Independence in general means, for
min,d. ,,8

Royce, being devoid of relations.

2.

Mzaticism
R07ce proceeds to the second conception of Being, My'stieism.

6 I 'bid.

-

?!.2!.:!.

8Ibid. , p. 13.

-

9~., p. 61.

7
~his

1s the anoient opponent ot Realism.

In itselt M7sticism is

more religious than philosophical, out underlying it is a de:finite
philosophy.
~titutes

Many disregard MysticisM because, they teel, it sub-

tee lings :for realitJ.

But theJ Yiew it externally from a

realist's position and, so, do not trulJ understand Mystioism.
The philosophioal Mystic, u8uallJ, is one who has begun in
Realism but then, since he found contradiotions in it, has come to
~oubt
~hey

~n

it.

The Mystic teels that ideas are talse precisely because

are just ideas and not the reality.

Reali t1 is not to be f'o\.lJ!

profound 1deas, but in the profundity of' experience.

The'rea1,

ror the Mystic, can be had only immediately, that 1s, without the
~dium 01'

ideas.

"Or in other words, Reality 1s that which lOU can

urlUediately teel when, thought sa~isfied, JOu cease to think. ,,10
Royoe oalls the Mystic the only true empiricist, tor the
Mystic holds that all truth 1s to be found immedlate1.7.
and the known mUll t become one for true knowledge.
thought is a detect,

Ii

Tila knower

BeC8US e

01'

step awa,. f'rom rea1ItJ in the d irecti on 01'

illusion.
I t It takes a trance to tind such a tact, that is the

fault of our human ignorance and baseness. The tact
in question i8 alwals in lOU, is under your eles. The
inef'1'&b17 immediate 1s always present. Onl,., 1n lOur
blindness, you retuse to look at it, and preter to think
instend of illus1ons. The ineffably' immediate is also,
1f you 11ke. f'ar above lClow1edge, but that 18 becaUS!l
knowledge ordinarily maans contamination with ideas.
lOIbld., P. 8).

-

llIbid.

that.

8
The ~b'8t two conceptions ot being, whicb we have thus tar
~onsiderad, are polar opposites to each other. 12 Weither satisty
~a.rce

becHuse each presents in abstract terms onlT tragmentarr

views

or

reality.

We will now look at R07cets reo.etlon to each.

R01ce puts a question to the Realist:
Does 70ur world conta1n In just this sense Many
difterent, that ls mutually lndependent beings,
or does It contain onl7 One real being, whose inner
struct~r., perhaps simply, perhaps in£in1te17 camplex, !jl11 permits of no mutual independence ot
pHrts.
The Realist is now In a dilemma.

Whichever horn he choos.s,

Royce teels that he can logicallY' lead the Realist to inconsistencr·
First, the Realist says that reality ia made up ot m&nJ
beings.

It should be recalled that tor the Realist a being is that

which is Independent, in itself', epart f'rom othera.

R07ce now asks

the Reallst that leads h1m to 8a'1 that beinga are independent.

The

Realist replies that one aees In his experience that beings are independent.

True, the Realist adds, independent beings do enter in-

to relation with each other, e.g., through causality or love.

That

relation, indeed, is a f'act, a reality, and as such it too is independent.

How then, asks R07ce, can a thI:rd independent bind two

other independents. 14

-

12Ib1d ., p. 86.
13 Ibld. , p. 123.

-

l4I2!!.,

p. 128.

Obvious17. it oannot.

9
The Realist has turned to experience tor evidence ot his aslertion that beings are many and independent.
~xperience,

precisely here, in

Royce teels that he has the Realist.

But now I dietinctly decline to admit that, in our
concrete hurilan experience, you can ever show me any two
physically real objects which. are 80 independent of each
other that no change in ~ne of them need correspond to
any change of the other. !>
Whe laws of physics, as well as ethnical and ethical laws, indicate
~hat

there is a tight solidarity in the universe.

then, aeems to give evidence against the Realist.
~oyce

~ngs

Hmuan experience,
Furthermore,

.flatly states that the Realist 1s wrong in thinking that be ...
are originally independent and then later enter into a rela-

~ion.

Onets awareness is What changes.
What happens when' we 8 ay that the1 pass from mutual
ihdependence to linkage, 1s reallj that we find them,
in our experience, passing fron1 relations Whose importance is merely to U8 le.8 obvious, into relations of
more obvioua human interest. But now the relations of
an object in 0lginary experience make parts of the
object itsel.f.
The Realist muat admit now that beings cannot be man)" a.nd,

ao, completely independent of one another, for it i8 seen in experience that beings are related.

Since a being must be independ-

ent and s1nce th1ngs are related in the world, the Realist would
say that reality 1s just one being.

However, Royce points out that

~onlsm

"For let us remember that, as

is impossible tor a Realist.

-

lSIbid., p. 125.

l6~., p. 126.

10

we observed betore, there are already at least Two genuinely and
absolutely independent real Beings in the realistic world. h17 The
Rea11st must at least 8ay that the real and his idea ot it are bota
beings.

Since they are independent

considered separate realities.

o~

one another, they must be

But it the Realist's idea about tne

real 1s independent ot the real, it cannot truly be an idea about
the roe.l.
The realistic theory, then, as we now know, by its own
explicit consequences, and just because its real object.
are totallJ independent or its idea., has nothing to do
with any independently real object, and has no relat10n
to the iffJependent external world that its own ac.count
defIne ••
At this point, the Realist b1 the logical interences in his own
doctrine has nothing as the Object othis ph11osophT.

"In brief,

the realm ot a consistent Real18M 1s not the realm at one nor yet
the realm of Man,., it is the realm

or

absolutely lfothlng."l9

Ifo doubt, the realists among the readers will have ready
man,. counter-arguments to Meet Royce'. reasoning.
ab11 agree with William James when he
as:

"what an ass

o~

a reallst. tt

20

re~erred'

They w1ll prob-

,to Royce' B Realist

But whether Royce has depicted

the Realist as belng too naive or not Is not the

conce~

Rather, only a brief look at Royce'8 'fiaw on :realism is

here.

t.~a.nted,

l1Ib1d., p. 133.

-

181bid ., p. 136.
19 IbId ., p. 137.

20R• B.

Parr", The Thougnt and Character of William James,
Vol. I (Bostont L1ttIi"; Brown, aii'Ocomp&llJ, 191$), p. 818.

in

11

order to have a better understanding of what he will mean b,. his
'Fourth Conception of Being. It
The Mystic defines reallt7 as that which 18 one with the
The unconsoious Absolute becomes a"ra.!:'. ot itself in ita

~nower.

rinite aspects.

At firat, men falsely see themaelves as distinct

from their objects.
~mmedi.ac7
~he

Than, as

~stica, tne,. oome to • stage of

whioh satisfies all their ideas.

aura of Illusion about

Royce cannot bear with

~~stici8m.

It follows that it M1sticism is to escape trom
its own finitude, and really la to mean by its absolute
Being an7thing but a Mere Noth1ng, ita aocount ot Being
~st be so amended as to Involve the assertion that our
fin.1te life is not mere illUSion, that our ideas lu'e not
merely talse, and that
are already, even as finite,
:tn touch w1th Reality. 2

le

The Absolute for the Mystic has reality only in relat10n to
~he

c9nscious striving of the finite

Jward the Absolute.

mnediac1 with the Absolute 1s the Mystio's goal.

To achieve it

pe must renounce the illusions ot his finite consciousness.
~oing

Pure

In so

he renders not onl, himself nothing, but the Absolute as

wel~

• • • we bring the mystic's case to its close, by
pointing out that his Absolute. in its abstraction,
is preoisely as much. and in exaotly the same sense
of the terms a NothiD§! as, by his hypothesls, his
ow~ oonsoiousness is.
~.

Critical Rationalism
The Third Conception of'" being identl.f1.es being with validity.

Phat is valid which tits in a .formal

---

syste~.

--- --- ----------

Its original exponent

21Royce. The World and the Individual, I, 182.

-

22 Ibid ., p. 195.

12

is Kant. 23
ena.

A sharp separation is made between noumena and pbenam-

By that separation the Critical Rationalist hopes to avoid

the presumptions of" other philosophies.
The truth, validi.t,-, or determina.te possibility' of the
experienoe in question, may be, so far as yet appears,
either transient 01' eternal, either relative or a.bsolute,
either something valid for a limited group or people, or
something valid ror all possible rational beings. But
in any case, this third definition of Being attempts to
identity the validit;r or the ~qea with the true Being of"
the fact defined b.r the idea. 4
Ro;rce links many prominent phIlosophers with thI* ThIrd Conoeption of aeing:

st. Augustine in identItJing Goa. with Veritas,

St. Thomas in relating the Divine Ideas to God, Plato in holding a
realm of essences, Aristotle in having the notion of possible being. 25
Precis ely on the central theme of the Third Conception, on
the Identif"ioB.tion of validit;r and being, Hoyce finds fault.
Now what our Third Conception so far fails to explain
to us is precisely the difference between the realit;r
that is to be attributed to the valid truths that we
do not get concl~etely verIfied in our own experience, 26
and the reality observed by us when we do verify ideas.
FUrthermore, since being appears only universally for the Third
ception, tne selt knowing cannot be a being.

C~~

But the self, which

certainly is individual, must be a being to ground, as the knower,

24~ •• p. 221.
2~Ibid. , pp. 228-29.

26-Ibid.,

p.

260.

1.3

~he being ot his id8as. 27 The Third Conception ot Being actual17
~oes

not la7 cla1m to know an7 reali t7 which would be mOl'e than a

~onstructian

01'

the mind.

Given the human situation, man at best,

according to the Third Conception, can come to a clarity of

thought~

B1 retleoting on the struoture of his mind, man oan a ee his process

of categorization.

Then, he ce,n more precisely clasai17 his data.

Since all men have the

I

ame mental structure, the greater the pre ..

cision in thinking the greater will be the un1tormit,.' in the community ot human knowledge.
But I point out t.ba t the 1r real! ty, t he true Be ins ot
these obJeots, is in no wise detined when you merely
speak ot the ideas as nothing but valid, becaua. the
assertion ot validity i8 so tar merely the assertion
ot a correspondence between a preauppoaed idea and ita
assumed object, without any account as y~e either ot
the object, or ot the truth ot the idea.
The critical rationalist is satisfied in canceiving reality
in an ftaa it" manner.

He teels that although one can never know

the really real one can pretend as it he doe., becauae practical
living demands such a preten.e.

Our oritical rationali.t live. in a world where nothing
in the realistic sense is real, but where it is as if
there were independent realities, which, wIii"nmore clo.e17 examined, pr!,e to be merely more or less valid
and permanent ideas.

4. !!!. Szpthesis
The

oonsiderations ot the previous three conceptions ot beinE

-

27Ib1d., p. 261.

-

28Ib1d ., p • .352.

29 Ib1d ., p.

-

24.3.
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lead to Roycets own conception, the Fourth.

In it he has 1ncorpo-

rated the signif1cant elements of the other conceptions.
~ame

time, he feels, he has by meana ot his synthesis overoome the

~ontradictions

~ions of

which are the logical outcome of the other concep-

being.

The real, for Royce, cannot be an isolated fact.
~e

a total17 independent other.

~1stem

It cannot

It oannot be an und1fferentiated

It cannot be a valid universal.

one.

~nce

At the

The real is a unique,

unlf1~

of idea., which are embodiment. of will in that their exist-

is their purpose.

"What is, or what is real, is as such the

complete embodiment, in individual form and in final fulfilment, of
the internal meaning of f1nite ideas."30
Por Royce, 1dea do •• not mean just a repr•• entation.

Rather

it is also an embod1ment ot purpos.:
But the primar, character, wh1ch make. 1t an Idea, 1.
not this 1ts repreaentat1ve character, 1s not ita vicarious assumption of tha res pona1bili t1' of atanding foft a
being beyond 1tselt, but 1s ita 1nner cnaracter aa relatively fultI111ng the purpose (that 1a, as present1ng
the pafttial tultI~nt ot the purpose), which i8 in the 31
consc10usness of the moment wherein the idea takes place.
The meaning of an idea haa two aspecta:

the external.

Th. internal meaning refeft. to the subjective aspect

of the idea, i ••• , the reason
~ave

this particular idea.

-

the internal and

30 Ibid ., p. 339.

31 Ibid ., p. 24.

Vhf

the knower wishes or wIlls to
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Now this purpose, just in so far as it gets a present
conscious embodiment in the contents and in the form
of the complex state oalled the idea, constitutes what
I shall hereatter oall the Internal Meaning of the Idea. 32
The external meaning refers to the objective aspect of the idea,
1.e., to external reterent of the idea.

For example, in the state-

ment "John loves Mary," the external meaning i. the fultilment at
Johnts wish to love this unique person,

At first, the external meaning aeems to tran.cend completely the 1nternal.33 HowM~.

ever, Royce .ee. a defint te cont1nuIt,.. be tweel1 the two meanIngs.
Indeed, the external actually has significance only as an internal
meaning.
In other words, we shall 1'i nd .i ther that the external
meaning is genuinel,.. continuous with the internal meaning, and is inwardly involved in the latter, or else
that the idea has no external meaning at 811.34
We shall assert, in the end, that the tinal meaning ot
e"e17 complete idea, when r ully developed, must be viewed
a. wholly an internal meaning, and that all apparently
external meanings become consistent with internal meanings on17 bJ virtue of thus coming to be viewed· as a ....
pect. at the true internal meaning.J~
Mary in her internal meaning 18 the determined correlate to
John's internal meaning.

So, in thIs lense, Mary is by no mean.

a neutral objeot with respect to the active 8ucject, John. Rather,
both in accord with their own internal meanings act harmoniousl,...

3 21bio., p. 25.

-

-

331b id. , p. 27

-

34Ibid., p. 33.

35 Ibid .,

-

p. 34.
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In other words,

Mr~y

has external meaning for John only becauae of

her and hi. internal meanings.
Reality, then, is the fulfilment of will,36 for, it will be
seen, will determines internal meanings.

The intellect in seeking

the truth of being must look for sn appreciat1.on of the internal
meaning of being.
A will concretely embodied in a 11fe,--and these meanings
identical wi th t he very purposes tba t our poor fleeting
finite ideas are even now so fragmentarily seeking, amidst
all their flickerings nnd th~ir conflicts, to express,-this, I say, i. the reality.J7
In his Pourth Conception, Royce think. that he haa incorpo-

rated the good points of the other conceptions.

With his synthesil

he has overoome the intrinsic contradiotions of the others.
Realism in its definition of being has laid great weight on
"other. tt

"otb.ertt assumes the authority over ideas.

the cri ter~, Qn for truth or falsi ty.

Royce agrees with t he Realist

in that "other" is a constitutIve of • finite idea.
idea does seek ita own Other. tf38

"Other" is

"The finite

However, this "other" is not

something totally independent ot the tinite ide. (nor, also, ot
the one Who has the

idea)~'

The1r being, that ot tM "other" and

that of the idea, is so bound together that it cannot be separated 4
(This will become clearer 1n connection with the Absolute.)

"Yet

the ldea 8ubm1 ts to no external :meaning that is not the developmen1

-

36 Ib ld., II, 432.
37 Ibid
_" I, 359.
38 Ibld ., p. 353.
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,r

its own roe~ning. ,.39

Clearly, the idea 1 s dependent on the

other" for its whatnesa and the fact that it is.

Not so clear now

p~rh!:tps,

is that the "other" is dependent on the idea for both its

~hatnes8

and its existence.

'OS8,

and so haa ita baing, only ns fulfilling its own internal

~aning.
,,0

The "other: however, achieves its pur-

It ita internal meaning is precisely- to be the complenlent

a tini te idea, then It 1a dependent on that idea tor

~. ts

whatne.

Lnd its exiatence.
The opposite pole ot Real1s., Mysticism, has held to the com-

plet. Identiflcation ot being in one.

The }Pourth Conception of

Being atressea, also, the l.mity of being in that everything that is
is a fulfIlment of purpose which flows trom the one will of the
~b.olute.

Thua, the mystical identification of the world aad the

Absolute Self bas been in a modified form incorporation into the
Fourth Conception.
The Pourth Oonception of Being agree. with critical rational-

lsm in that being gives validit7 to 1deas.

"The valid finite Idea

is first. far whoever possess it, an observed and empirieal fulfilD1EIl t

of puppose. "40

However, the Fourth Conoeption would not equR

the idea with the "other.-

Iadeed, precise17 insofar .s the "othel

Is not defIned, juat so tar it 1s not that finite idea and i8 the
"other."

The nothor" haa 11;s own intemal meaning wh1ch, it w111

be seen is derived from Will.

39 I b1d.,

4oIbid.,

-

p.

354.

p. 3$6.
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What therefore you bave not thus defined is precise17
the Being or the objeot all other than the very finite
idea which is to regard It as an other. It' YCHl have
once observed thi. derect ot &nJ aasertion ot a bare
poss! bili t7 of experience, you will have seen \i'l'\Y the
mere det1nition ot universal types can never reach the
expression ot tne whole nature ot real Beings, and w~,
tor that very res8on, the realm ot ValIdity 1s nothIng
unlea. It 18 more than m.erely valid, nothing too unless
it takes an individual form ~~ an unique fulfilment ot
purpose in a oompleted llf'e.Ji.
[.ChQ real cannot be sati.ried by universals devoid ot volitIonal
charaoteriatic••
The essenoe ot the Real is to be Ind! vidual, or to perm1t

no other ot its own kind, and th1s charact~r 1t posseasea
only as the unique fulfilmen t ot plU'pOa8. 4

Iiis diasa.tisi'action with the other concept1ons ot being haa
lead ROTC. 1nto his own oonception.

In this framework, will gives

realltr its significance, which intelleot must appreoiate.
real, then, ia freed trom intellectual aostraction.

The

The real, to

be real, JIlWJt be individual, just as the will in willIng must will
~niqu.lJ

a unique tultllm6nt of Its wIlling.

This final form of the idoa, this final object sought
when we .eek Being, 18 (1) a complete expression of the
internal m.!oaning of the .finIte Idea with wh1ch, 1n an,.
oa.8, we start our questJ (2) a complete fulfilment ot
the will or purpose partiall,. &mbodied in this idea;
(l) an individual lite tor whIch no other can be subatituted. 43

Wi th. this .ketoh of Royce t s me taph1'1J ias, 1 t 1 Ii hoped tha. t the ,
presentation of hla notion of" the individual h.uman salt will be

41 101d.,
42 I bld.,
43 Ibid ••

-

pp. 357-58.
p. 348.
pp.

340-41.
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more intelligible.

Also, in the course ot the presentation it i.

hoped that the Fourth Conception ot Being will become more meaning-

tul, especiallT as the tunction ot the Absolute is brou6ht to light
We can t.beret~ 18.1 a81de altogether our ifs and then.,
our yaliditz and our other such terms, whiilwe speak of'
this tina! conoept or Being. What is, Is tor WI no
longer a mere Porm, but a Lite; and in our world of what
was before more truth tte lIght ot. Indi vldualit1 and ot
will have tlnal~ begun to sb1ne.44

B.

Abaolute--tlntte Eolaritz
!bD relatIon

be reviewed.

only in

b.~.rwe.n

tt. Absolute and finite beings must now

Since the h'tUl1f:l.n

rel~tion

sEll,f takes on

to the Absolute,

tion must be had.

80me

its true significance

understanding of tnat rela-

Is Royce here speaking in

tl~

context of logic,

of epistemology, of ps¥,chology, of religion, or of metaphysics?
In some sense be i . in each context.

He is in a metaphySical conI

text when he talks of the Absolute--finite relation.
All tinite beings are expressions of the Absolute.
lute 18 the integral whole of U18 finite beinGs.

The Abso-

The fInite bains

haa Ita existenee cnl7 as fulfilling trult role in the total expression whieh the Absolute wills to it.

FOr free

bein~,

the per-

fect expression ot the Absolute's will is their ideal selves.
Absolut~

i8,

t~!l,

The

ccmplete17 immanent in the finite expression••

NeYertheless, the Absolute is not dependent on anI particular finite being or grnup ot beings tor ita existenoe or its form.
finds 1 t8 expression In the finite beings.

-

44Ibid., p. 342.

It

The form of the total

jexpreaat.OD anI5 tbat 1t

ex1sts at all, how.vt>r, 1. cont1rlf:)ent OIl tbe

abouU a tree aaCtt tetl 1ft aoh1evl1l6 its Ide.l

IAbsolute'a will.

•• It, tb.8 Abaolute oOJlPGns.'•• 1'01' th" corN.PODding void tn tta

tlu-oup anoth*r .rlD1te be1na.

~xp:re •• 1Oft

ro be. we haV$ •• td. meum. tc tult!l a £u!i?0••• in hot,
'to l'U1tl1 1n t1niil, 1rul1vldti'il" '.xlweailon, £1ii ~b_ pu-

la...... .na·t:a8lJ, the tbaolu.te pw.*po... OUI' clo•• r--atudJ
kula shown us tba t thi. Absolute purpoae 1. not unl¥ an.,
but_lli,,> intInItel,. cOMplex, 110 that Ita \lilt t7 1s the
unItT ot JitW7 Wl11_, IiUlCtb. oae of' wtdoh tInda 1t. oxpres.loa In tA.n trtd1 vldual lite, while theta. 11".e, aa

a.lvee. bav(t

tbe 11vEl8 of .,•••10us

8.fipeot 1n Mblch

ali

tbey au'. tree, !.n eo rill' fiB each, whlle 1n ~ asp.ota
determ1ne4, 1. atiell 1n lta own t1ft ..un.~re a det.l"Idne~
or all the "$t. f~5
A::'l 1nterMl
Abaolute '$ wll1.
only 1n

tOrtl8

_an1nsa ot

ide.ta. then,

AU external _aning.

or tnt.mal

wIll ot the Absolute..

_&Ull~ t

ltt-6

fWfi

aub.UI1ted W1MP tbt

ult1_tel.,. .ienttle_'

Whiob arts h.ttrmon1aed In the oae

-rhu.s, all _anina In the Mo!"ld

nov,.

tZ'OI1

the ,tb.olut... who will. ·10 expre ••1.0Il, whicb 1. 1tuelt.. to be

na It 19

~r

BUob.

will he •

. .~ 1. tho Abaolute,

~oat:.e 1n the b,tes-rrelat1crwbipa
Of(i'ontr'a~t6d Euc.preaa1one of at. single \-1111 lie. the oDl,.
oppos-turd tl tQ~ UlfIl embocl1Mn t
wholenes. ot 11te, and

ot

tor the poa •••aion of SCllf-oonaclouentu,. bl tnt! AhfS(\lute. 46

'.[10 be
[beiDg 1s
!\,osolu.t...

4\

~17

be1.n t,. then Inplle!l uniquenesD

~Uld

lndlv14u.allt7.

insofar aa It fulfils a p'lrtloulu purpo8t1 ot the

Sinee

fl

purpos. mWJt be unique

R.!~d

individual, an cx-

prcDsion or th&t purpo$etluet be unlq,oo tI.na individual.

4>lb14., II, ))$-)6.

401~ld., p. 336.

Wit.hout

A
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udquene.a with respect to purpo•• there can be no indIvIduatIon.
_lnce beings cbvloualJare indIYiduated on the fIn1te level aa ex~r.8.1ons,

the,. muat be unique.

Indivlduals are. all va~lous expresaloma ot the Absolute,
In so far is tney are Many, just becauae_ where the One
ls individual, everT ~.p.ct and element ot its •• 1£-

expres8ion 18

unlque.~1

The Absolute 1s in eternity, wluoh ia the totalIty ot tlm••
past, present, and tuture.
lIemporal; that i8 to sa."

The tinlte expression ls essentlall7
it is always lImited to a particular tIll.

For the a ake ot clarificatIon, a parallel
~bsolute

ldeas.

ls like a man;

th~

CUl

be made.

fba

finite exprossions are l1ke the DIan's

The man freely choos •• hia. 1deaa(he at least haa tr.edom ot

exerc1se) •

The ideas make the man who he is.

Ultimat.q, the Id".

ape on17 tor the sake ot the roan, that ne lQ.ay be with suoh a deter~ination
~o

or form.

Of

tbem3~lves.

the ideas are noth1ngJ the,. ba••

Significance but in relntlon to the

lllfUl.

The man's oonsclous-

ness of hluelf transcends any partioular m.oment of being_
Ideas are lecated. in tirllf).

The

The man knows his Idea.s ln x'elatlon to

a time _ The )Jilin would be d1fferent it be had cho.en a dirt.ren'
Ide. or set of' ideals.

Thus, the man Is independent of anJ par-

ticular ideas, whereas the 1deas are totally dependent on the man.

However" the n18l1 needs ideal to express hi. sel1"hood, to be himaeltlAdmittedly, the above parallel

hRS

much of the tone of pay-

chologJ in it.

However. it should be kept in mind tbat Royce 1a

not a aeallst.

He 18 an Ideallst.

~o

be is to be an expreaaion

22
of the frbsolute, to be, in a sense, his Idea, whioh fulfIls a purpose that the

~bsolute

wIlla for him8elt.

In such a tramework, th

reali.t's clear-cut d'.stInet101'1 between the purely pS'1ohologioal
and the ontologioal fades.

Thu8, what sounds like psychol()g7in

the realist's terminology i . actually metaphysical in ROToets.

ot course, the parallel limps.

~he

so-called ideas ot the

Absolute, I.e., finite beings, can beve their own consciousness ftn
powe.. to will.

IJ!hst Ie pcasible because the Absolute has

thia expresslon.

Indeed, ROTce would

8

80

wl11e

a:y tb.a t perhaps thlngs to

whlch we do not ordinarlly attribute oon801018n••1 !letua 117 ln t 1»
Iche. other than the b.u:me.n he:,e conaolouaneal.

perlenoe a rullion 7ears aa

Ii

If ..,. were to ex...

manent, then, perhaps, so-culled in-

Sinee to be i8 t·

animate things 'Hould seem to he. ve consciousM8 s.

.fulfil purpose and since the purpose 1n the an'_:m9.1 kingdom is fulfilled by the speoles rather than the individual, then.

viewed in a dIfferent scheme an animal species as
on the characteristios ot a person.
hardly the ohiet

conce~na

or

Royce.

fl.

~rhap8,

unit would tak

But such speculations are

Primar1lr, he ie

Interes~ed

1

the human pe7scn. whoa. eonsoiouene88 we experience in ourselves

an d 1n other l!'18n.

c.

World!?! APErecia tl on--World

.£!

Desari2tlon

R07ce divides the world otmen into two aspects.

One 1s the

World o.f Apprecle.tlon;: the other is the World ot Description.
The \f!orld ot Appreo1at1on ls that ot aternal meanlne.
t7U8 reallt7 ot a being 1. It. Internal meanina.
• •~pJ'8ssi_ ',of". Absolute'. w1ll

that bein

The

Insotar as he ls
i.

an ontolo

cal
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reality.

Thus, if one i8 to appreciate reality he must become

aware of the internal meanings of things.

Indeed, i f one is to

appreciate himself as a self he must become aware of hie own Internal meaning, as an expre ssi on of the Absolu.te.

When one

dO~8

become aware of his ideal self' as it 1s determined b,. the Absolutfll,
then snd on11' tOtn can he make real progress in his self-development.

'.Chen and onl,. then 1s he consclous of himse If as belongins

to the World of Appreciation.
It 18 known trom psychology, aD! indeed from common experience, that ohilclJ.. n tend to have

&

selt-centered view ot ree.Jj.ty.

The child sees things and persona onl,. 1n relatlon to hlmself.
Only atter a long and arduous per10d oJ: maturation, whlen lasts his
whole 11fetime, does the child become adu:&'t enough to
belngs-in-themselves.

8

ee others as

Of course, some al"Hays retain a childish

view oJ: the world, that others

8.I'El

only in rels"ti on to them.

Such

people usually spend their last days in prisons or, if they are ex-

trem. enough in their attltudes, in insane A..,.luma.
The true world, the World of Values or of Appreoiation,
as rightly viewed by an absolute insight, would be a
world of H~l.es. forming in the unity or their 8ysteMS
One Self.

So strong i8 the egocentric attitude in

rr\~m

that onl,. after

much attentlon to the reality of others does one come to an appreoiation of their internal meanings.

One must transoend the exter-

nal meaning ot other, ln order to come to an appreolation ot other

24
as an expression of· the Absolute 1n ita own unlquones& find individuality.

In the statement, John loves Ms.,..,.. it waD pointed out, the

external meaning was that Marya. being loved b1 John.

Mary 18 the

reterent for the idea, true; but .be is only insofa.r as she 1s lowe
b1 John.

John could love her for ro8.117 reasons, which would come

out in the internal meaning of the atatement.

John' a love would

flctually be .elt-love if he does not tl'enscend to tb.e level of appreoiation ror Mary in her othern....
must become awaft

or

To appreoiate Mar,y, John

.her interonal meaning.

That In1'inlte17 rich

and intrioate meaning, which -il an integral part of the Absolute's
expression of himsel..f, will nev.r be comprehended by Jolm.

He

must, nevertheless, approach .uch an appreciation of Mary, and ot
ever7thing else, a180.

Only in tbet way can he truly know reality.

onl,. in that wa,. can he become himself.
The World or Descroiptlon, theseomd aspect ot m.ai1 t s world,
is the world of 801ence, or validity, ot universals.

Man classl-

ties be1nga 1n the World of Description so tbet he can get a better
hold on them. for hls own use8.

Here the other i. seen onl,. as hav·

ing, or possibly having, some relatlon to the

l11IUl.

Men agree among

themaelves on their classltications for theaake of commruoodcation.
Need leads them to categorize cert&in beings under a certain type.
'llhus, In the World ot Description real1t,.. has a much watered down
signiticance.

The external meanlng, seen .s universal and perti-

nent to men 1n general, has the prominent position 1n the World ot
Descr1pt1on.

Nevertheless, it would seem thBt man,. men live in the
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world

or

Description whole-heartedly withOut tile least inclining

toward, the World or Appreci6IL tion.
selvea aa men.

The.r are

livil~

Theso li.en cannot develop them-

1n an unreal world of their own

tcrmulation.
The tru.ly human man will see the World of Description for

what it 11$.

He will 8ub1'l'dt to it.a conventions.

He will organize

data ot hi. aoienoe along the 11nea ot interest prescribed by the
World of Description.

However, the truly h'UlilaIl m.an will not be

deceived into thinking that that is the whole of realitT.

Indeed

he will live hia lite in the World of Appreciation in oonJunotion
with the Absolute.

CHAPTER II

THE KUMA. SreLP DEFIlED
Deso&.rtc:s established the existence of the self by his tantOus

ormula "coglt<?,. erio !!:!!!."

or

oourse, preselltlna; the bare exist-

the self sa.18 little ot ita nsture.
ndlvidual, or i8 it a logical torm?

mpirical situations, or 1s it

Ii

Is tile self

Ii

unique

Is it the swmnatlon ot its

transcendental absolute?

ROloe ma1 be sa14 to have tollowed up Descartes' phrase wIth

.!2

similar one:

~

quantum.!.2!2.

When one in looking tor oer-

itude, tor ,..altt,-. sublatea the sana •• , 1111 tends to IdentitJ self

lth thougbt or will.

For R07ce, will is the keynote tor aelt.

ow.ver. it i8 not a blind will.
oyce

r.~.

Somew.cat like Aristotle's telos,

vill .s an intrinsio constItutIve of the self and aa

epending on intellectual understanding tor ita guld4nee.

ROlce

"om.bines the volitional and intellectual chAit.I·acter of' the aelf in
concept ot purpose, whioh is the ultimate reality of the

sel~.

Kant aaw. too, that purpo•• is the highest unitylng principle

that men t end to attribute the order about them to some purpose
i ving Absolute.

Tbis highest tormal un1t7. which rests solely on
concepts ot reason, i& the purposive unity or things.
The apeculati ve inter.at ot reason mak.es it necessaI7
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to regard all order in the world •• It it had 1
originated in the purpoae ot a supreme reason.
It wIll be •• en that R07ce doe. just that.
the s61f in

&1

abstract system 01' valldlt7_

.aut he does not bU17
Royce is ever

concern~

with the concrete; tor hIm, to be, one must be an 1ndividual.

He

strongly recoIls .trom phl1oaophicnl expl9.nations wh1ch are lacking
in human1stic appreciatlon. 2
Now that there is, 1'1-om. t he .first ohapter, some notion ot

Royoe's metaphysical orientation, this ohapter will present R07oe's
detinition ot the human self.

It will formulate Royce's def1nItion

around three aspecta of the aeltl

that the selt i . (1) 1ndivldual,

(2) un1que, (.3) aelf-id.entlcal and sf:llt-ldentlt'"y"lng.

Finally, then

R01'Oe'lI own terM person will be applied to tao subsiatent human

selt.
The focHl point ot' this chapter is the person.
ter

1~Till

A later chap-

look to the relation between the person !I.lld the Absolute,

between the person 8l1d his world and the total conmunitl, and alao
the relation between persolls.
The World. and
-----

.......-

the IndivIdual,
.. Vol. II oontains thB oore ot

~

Ro)"ce'8 thought about the b:uman. selt.

lWorks explicate the conaequencAs

ot

selt with respeot to areas of social

Perhaps, he may in later

his

metap~aIcs

11ving~

of the human

-

but, in the World and

11mBanuel Xant, Crlti~ue ot Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp
~ml th (London: Macmillan and 0'07, ~9), p. 560.
2Josiah ROlce, The Spirit of Modern Philos0phz (Hoston:
!Houghton, Mittlin andCOmpall1, 1~2), p. 2r;.
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~ I!!~1.1ch.l!i\1.

expftu.d.

,.1

Vol.II. ate notion of tbe nUMll .elt 1. e ••• n'lal17

In Me preface to the sa.ond Volume he

lnd1ea~8

what

h.e W1l1 ••

From ttature thai •• leot;urt::a paas to Ule ~n Sftlt.
Oharaoterlatl0 ot tAla p~ oC tlvt &,...-n" end of
ppevloua atAt.B'JI)nt.s ot mJ 0'IIIli upon the aa_ topic, are •
. , ant1N w1111Q&n••• to 1&7 .. ide .11 ••• ort10n of till
existence of a aubat$l.llti.ltl Soul. r1¥ unr~e.rvt,d acceptance of the ewpl"'lc~.l evidence ru£ardi.~ the dependence
or the Human f'.U, for l-.:;s tef-'!lporal or1sln. £(.)11 1i.e
d.volo~D.', Ana tor- Ita p....rvkt!on 1n Ita present
t'Ol"ll 0:'''' lite, upon phfei.citl rf,(i see1&1 cOfu:t1tlontl; ,md
fill lnalatence tlw t yulo1.:.a a.l"•• can po.s.aa, In the
whole OJ- Sa .. fN.,-rt at ttlltl1' lives, Ident,l(u.llr the JUtnt'
••p . .l . . . . . . . . ~ OIle Self can originate, or c a n t4evelnp within ttnot.n.r Self, lind 8() thr:lt the 11"88 o~
varloya I.t"•• Cq be lnt.c:u"Wo".n. 1n tl» -.oa t eoaaplex
way8.
H0108 apPNo1at;es th.. tao' tnat
1;.0

~h..

gl"flat6st atuub11ns block

an idea11stic pbllc"epi1J is tile problerlt of' lntUv1duah1on. 4
l1~ouncl

.VElI', hAt

reels tru, t much of the

Volwu.

He ",111 expreae hi. notion

pnys10al tl'fAlMwovk.
toyoe

ai.sed

flS

tn.

or

hfUl Offen

el~a.l'8d

How-

in bi. PI...

the hUl'lan aelt 111 M8 .ta-

Th1a chapteJII ,,1111 t17. then, to look w1th

betocsua• • • tbl mUllilUl aolf'.

"'rAe

tOl'"tMi1"

leotures tmlpha-

W<»"14; the pre$c:rtt Gour•• t:t1all hil d1r.cted to\>"arda an

IUlde:ratandllla ot the HW'MII In4! v1dual. !·S
Indl'tldual

.,.

1.

"'he

b.~

~Q.liht 1'fIJJ7

.elf for HOloe 1* an lnd1 vldUlll.

.eem trlte to t:n. laTIJ!lAn, to tbo••

Al thoug~ such

140M

aD

aoquainted with
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tile llistor1

ot phl108ophl

the insight i8 of consequence.

The ulti-

mate realitl of th6 human person, from Kant through Resel, has
evolved as the transcendelltal ego.

11ho tr&.1'l8 oendental ego, strip-

ped of all the individuating characteristics ot the empirical ego,
weld.s the reality ot men into a one.

What is nonsenae to the 187-

man ot everyda1 experience is &ean b.r the philosophers a8 a brilliantly worked out logical system, which can hardlJ be disoardeu

with a word ot rebuttal.

ROTC., who was tullT aware ot the doctrlnea of hi. predecessora, bas eo_ out boldlr in the opposite direction.

ROJ'oe aaTs

that tor anything to be real it must be indivldual. 6

Indeed. the

ult1Jnate reality of a being 1. found 111 his indlviduali",.

io

tranacendental sphere, whare content 1. spurned in order to get

some pure form, 1. the seat of the real tor Rorce.

10 universal

nature, which .tanda aloot from the concrete perta.tiona at tinite
man, is given

a8

the real trutn of man by ROTce.

Royoe, tore.

Skuldowlng the e:rlatentials, has gIven to the concrete individual
the prime place in reality.

What is the principle ot individuation for fio70e?
lev.l,the question maJ b. phrased:

what is the principle

ror Roroe, ainoe to be mean. to be individual.
indi vlduatlon i8

pul'pOBe.

At a deepe

ot be1ns

The principle ot

Purpose gIve. 011. hi. l"8allt,.. whIch can-

not be that ot anothett, tor it it weN the. the other would be hlaselt, i.e.. the other would not be otber.

)0
The pUl'poa. of eaoh finite being 1s deternl1netd '01 the Abso-

It baa been .een already thE. t the tin1 te beings are exprea-

lute.

ot the Absolute.

.iona

The ptlZ"poae

or the Absolute 1n expressing

himael:f 1n th1. pal't1oular way and not in another g1 ves to the fi-

nit. belns beth ita exiatellCe . .cElts 1ndiY1duallty.

It the Abso-

lute in two lnatanc•• wanted to express himssl!, 1n the very same v
'II a., ,

the n thAII re would be only one t1ni te being.

!hus, the re all ty

of one beins canb.&t enol'Qa ch on another t $.
Perhapa

&. ~ontl'adlotlon

appears here to those who hay. not
It the finite beings

investigated the matter further with Royce.

are jut expressions ot the Absolute, doesn't that de!l)" the verr
posalbi+lt, of individuation tor tinite
~

ethical aelt i. in

Ii.

bel~?

Furthermore, if

senae 1nf"inite, does that _an that he haa

to be the same .s the Absolute?
'fbi. 1. ROJoe t S paradigm in the form

up tor what

be •• t

ot a table which will

tb& text expresses in words:

R0108 in

B

l

1

2

.'3

4

•

•

•

~1

2

4

8

16

•

•

•

12

.3

9

27

81

•

•

•

~3

...c::

25

125

62S

•

•

•

~4

7

49

34,3 2401

•

•

•

~5

11

121

•

•

•

l6

1)

169

•

•

•

7Thili

TT

hl.o_C::l

7
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Row A

1~·

the set of' l1hole numbcro.

series S08S to Infinity.

~he

Column B

'rhe dota indicate the.t

the set of

i8

pri~ numb~re.

prime numbers cannot be factored into mol" basi c numbers.
plso goes to infinity.
~umbers~

"hole
~

This set

Corresponding to eftch number of AI the

is each prime number raised to that power 1ndicated

num~r.

1o'ho~

h1 the

BecnUIB e prime numbers are basic no element In a set

!Im16vcr, all

\fl1l be the same as un element in another sot am-

the eler_nts ot everT set a will appear in

~.

The tlrst aet, A, contains all the numbers 01' the other sets,

ret It 1a an lndiyldual set 1n its own rIgb,t.
compared to the Absolute.

of" the tlrat, containa

DO

Such a eet -7 be

The aeoond set, al, whioh is a aub-.et
elements which can be round 1n any 01' the

Dther seta, a2 •••• but onl,. in the tirst one. A.

Baoh of" tbe sub-sets.

So it 1s with

Each .et trom the second to the lntlnl'tb.,

-1 to &oa, 1s contained In the first, AJ but 1n no wa"

partiall,.

or totall,., is a sub-s.t contained in any of" the

8ub-aeta ot

~he

othl~

first. A.

It 18 •• en f"ltom t he example clearly enough t.be. t none or the
~ub-s.tlJ

can be a part 01.' another sub-set.

In e. ai-miler we:"

eaoh

"'tntte being 1s Indlvi.duated :troM other finite beings by. lte f'vn
~haractar18tio

tora determined by its purpose.

r.e.peot to the Absolute tbe probleDl remaina.
petng be IndlYiduate4 .trom. tbe Abaolute'
~ot.

We.ertbeles8. with
Jlow can the tinite

'fhat ' . the point.

'l'bt rini t. being 1s indIviduate. in the Absolute.

.ets each appear in the tirat, A.

It 1.

The aub-

Each sub-a.t has an Intel11g1lfi1e r
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of its own, end so it is individual.

The first set has an intel-

ligibility of its own, w:uch i8 not the s arne as the t of the summa tion of the sub-sets, because it is a whole in itself.

Also,

there are many more possible sub-sets other than those based on the
prirr.es.

Therefore, it is seen that the first set A, is an individ-

ual and the t the others are also individuals, even while they appear in the first set.
number

or

Eaoh sub-set, by the

'II

ay, has an infinite

elenents; yet, it only pHrtlally mirrors

has an infinite number of elements.

ft"

wh1ch also

T.be etlliottl self is infinite

in that, 'because a .finite beint; is essentially ternporal, it will
never be fully expressed.
IWhen they

aI'8

(Tha t the S(;ts appear on different lines

put on paper ought not to lead one into thinking that

the sub-sets 'exist apart from the first set.)
For Royoe, to be is to fulril purpose.

If there is

ity of God and finite beings, it is a fcrmal enG.

an

iden-

In other 'Hords,

it the finite enters into the being of the Absolute by helping it
achieve Its purpose, then they have some identity.

"The identity

of the t"1n1te llnd the Absolute lllOan.ing' is. for us. now mere idenIti ty wi thom differoence. !,8
Here ia an analogy contrived by this author, Which maT help
Ito bring out Royce's idea.
~clous

or

Suppose each cell of the bod.1 we.s con-

ita aotivity in the integral body.

Suppose each l/lember

of the body was oonscious of its aotivity, which is beyond the colleoti va act! vlt;y 01.' the oells.

8 Ibid., p. 369.

-

The person, as the .• elt which
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ntegratea the parts into
~f

Ii!

harmonious whole, hRS a consciousness

his activity as the composite and, 8.lso, the consciousness of
pa.rts whicb he ia.

"he

If the above be admitted. tor the sake ot clariticati on ot
~oyce's

notion of the Absolute--tinite beings relationship, some

problems concerning identity may be resolved..
';hst

First, it is seen

this relation ot .identity is not reciprocal.

IIh. point

The cell, trom

ot view ot the whole, can be said to be the man.

At the

game ti .. , trom the point ot view of the cell itself, it can be
aid to have ita own proper identity.
IIha t the man is the c ell.

However, it cannot be said

Indeed, to say that the man is the sum-

nAtion of all hia cells and members with their :respeotive consciousleaa would not be enough, tor the man as an integral body ia concioua ot himself as a one.
)arts.

The whole is more than the sum of

Man is identical with the Absolute, for his achieving be-

ng is the expression of the Absolute, whioh is t.he Absolute it-

.elf.

But the Absolute is not the man.

Man, becorr.d.ng hiD18elt in

r--ime, haa a tpanscendental relation to the infinite Absolute, who
~tands

completely exppes.e4 in eternity.
The absolute tinds it. expres.ion in the finite expresaions

which oan be syncategorematically Intinite); yet, it has an intel~igibility

~t

over and beyond a multiplicity of finite expressions.

as an integral Whole is an individual.

~xpre8sions

But each of these finite

has an intelligibility ot its own in the Absolute. Each

s an individual.

IndiViduation can be appreoiated only in the
....
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intellectual sphere:

"All truth is the object of acknowledgement,

Rnd not Trierely of' immedia te experience. • • • •

luever show us individuality • • • • • ,,9

And the senses

Nevertheless, the human

!intellect cannot comprehend individuality.

Essentially. individ-

!uality is a characteristic derived trom will.
:~

Only the Absolute

1

Icomprehends his will and, so, the individuality of' f'inite beings.

i

The intelligibility which individuates the f'inite being as

a

it appears iu

tl.:i.G

.il.bsolute is its purpose.

Because that prinCiple

f'lows trom an intelligent Will, the heart of' reality ougnt to be
conceived as not just rational, but also volitional.

Correspond-

ingly, reality is known, not by intellect alone, but b,y an enlight

!

iened will in an a.ct ot appreciat1ve love.

The bare intellect can

m

come to an underatandins ot realIty's struGture.

A lovIng will is

in contact with the f'ull realIty, a structure enriched with indivi -

~

luality.

The Absolute in choosing a specif'ic purpose for himselt

I

ibrings into actuality an individual.

That purpose ordained by the

!!,

IAbsolute's will, whIch i8 the internal meaning of' the individual,
Icomes to be known in love.
Royce would aS80ciate universality with intellect and individuality With will. as also Marcel, Cro.e, Sturzo. and others

!

~.eem

it

to have done.

So 1t 1s that the individual can only be appre

!ciated
as individual by an act of' the will, vic., love.
s

The reali

~

~of' the individual lies in the realm of' will.
,~

-

9 Ib id., p. 159.

10

Ibi d ., p.

432.

Por the intellect,

3$
then, realit)" wl11 alwa)"s be beyond full comprehension, will be a
mystery.

11

But, of course, that i8 said

t~om

the tlnite position.

To the Absolute, the \<iorld is comprehensible because he i8 the one

who has ordered it.

In tact, the world can be only insofar as it

i8 ordered b7 the Absolute, who eternally gives each temporal inUltimtltely reality 18 rational, but its

41 vidual his purpo••• 12

parts rouat be
oompletely.

8 ..n

in the whole, &lnd only the Ab80lute

CHim

00

that

For tinite beings, Royoe will say in hi. later philos

ophJ, the ultimate reality e amot 'be had in .en•• -peroeption or in
abstraot conception, but only in "inte.pretation, tl 01117 1n a aympa

thetic appreoiation.
The tree will ot tn. Absolute ohoo.ea to express it.elt in
one finite expression among the lI:UII'ly possible choioe..

Thu., the

tinite being springs into existence and i . individual.
Yet this rtJ7 whole J'l6aning, while one with Hi. meaning,
l'8maina, in the et.mal world, still thi. unique snd
individual meaning, which the lite or no other indIvidual
Selt pos •• s.... So that in MJ eternal expre •• ion I 10••
not mr individuality, but rather win ~ oa17 genuine indiVii~1 expre.aion, even while I tind mJ onenesa with
God.

The human .elt i. Indi vidual, ot cour.e, becsuse it is a
being.

However, the individuating purpoae need not be satistied

in the existing m.anJ inde.d, because man i8 eS8entially temporal, I'

..
433.
12Royce, ~
llIbid., p.

Spirit

2!

Modern Pb1losoeer, p. 380.

--

lJnoyce, The World and the Individual, II, 1$0.

-

14Ibld., p. 428.
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the purpose cannot be satisfied.

Man must try to .fulfil his pur-

pose which is assign€ d to him by the Absolute.
aware or his purpose will be explained later.

How he beooaes
In trying to satisfy

the Absolute's purpose he is maklng himself more an individual.

"MON" is In the .enae that hls 11fe is unitled ancl a( controlled

in 1.ts direction that no other can la-r

hnl~

('61' '!t

~I!I

its own.

"MeSDwnile, I camot too strongl:r Insis t that, in our present torm
of human conaclousness, the true Selt of an:r Individual man is not
a datum, but an ideal.

1$

Here one ma:r well take except10n to Joseph Blau's interprets.ition of Ro:rce's notion of Ind1'flduallt;r.

He seems to infer that

",he ultlmate reality ot the self is ita disaolvement in the Absolute.

"Personal Independence is but-a temporar:r stage whose ultl~at. aim i8 the realization ot the unl'fersal will." l6 He regards
uemporallt,r as a mere stage ot the finite selt as it progresses towards its eternal fUSion in the Absolute.
this paper that the tinlte selt

t~

while exist1ng enl:r 1n the Absolute.

It has been shown 1n

Ro;rce retains its individua11t;r
Etern1t;r is for the Absolute,

as temporallt;r needs to be part ot tl» veFf make-up of an finite
selt.

It the finite aelt is eternal, then it must be eternally

lJemporal.

l610seph L. Blau, Men and MO'fements In Amerioan Philosophy
New Yoek: Prentice-Hal~Inc., 1952), p.~ll.
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B.

Unique
The human selt is unique.

other be like him.

No other 1.s like him, nor can any

!bat which makes him an indiviJual also makes

him unique.

Each individual has

unique purpose, which m.ake s him

individual.

As individuals, finite beings are materially distinct;

iii.

as unique entities, they are tormal17 distinct.

Since in Royce's

Ideali.tic ph110sopbJ the distinction ot matter and farm dissolves,
to be an individual means to

unique individual.

lit

And individuals are not kept asunder by CM.B",
but are made dis tinct through. tha 1r various
meanings, i.e. through the variet, ot the Pur-17
poses ot wniOh their lives are the expres.ion.
Each human selt hall a l.mlque Identl ty.
be the who he is ot another.
selt must be unique.

"Tho he is can never

Logically, in Royce's system

~ach

It one selt tind. its identity in relation

to all others, even it they be intinite in number, then one ot the
others camot have the very same identity.
~ite

It a set, be it inti-

or tinite, has elements Xl, %2' x ' ••• , the set of Xl'S

3

eomplementa17 elements (all those element.:s ot t he basic set whi eh
are not Xl) cannot be the set ot X2 '8 complementary elements. SilD
~l ia defined by its complementar,r elements, as %2 is by its, etc.,
~l

is a unique element in the basic ••t.
Since man i8 essentially temporal, according to Royce, eaoh

man must be unique.

Obviously. two men cannot appear at the s arne

time and in the aame place.

It this were to happen, then Royce

- -

-----

17Royce, The World and the Indiyidual, II, 239.

-

......
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would 8ay, according to his de,f'ini tiona, that there really is onl,.
one man.

If the men appear at different times, then each has a

different history behind him and a different future ahead of him.
Their worlda are different; thua, the men, too, must be different.
It the men appear at the same time in different places, they are
different.

The Bame goal,

the~

self, the same identity, cannot

be aohieved in di,f'ferent plaoes, tor there il at least a local dif
ferentiation.

Bach human aelt is unique, therefore.

The complex-

i t7 of the human Belt makes his uniqueness all the more evident.
Uniqueness gives to man a apeoial tie with the Absolute.

T

Absolute can be what .he ia, his expression c an be Buch, only beca
each man is who he is.

It a oertain man were not, t he Absolute

would not be less, but he would pe difterant trom what he i. it
the man does exist.

An infinite series would still be

infini~e

if

one of the elements were dropped, but it would not be the same
series.
Universal natures, then, are categories fer classification.
Because of the similarity in the purposes of certain finite beings
the,.

can be

grouped under 'bhe heading "men."

same universal form;

th~

Men do not have the

have their own proper unique forma which

approximate one another in kind.
.the ane essential tact about me.

"The uniqueness ot rr11' meaning is
,,18

The value ot the human person tlows, not trom some abstract
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essence, but from the individual's unique role in the very make-up
For Royce, everrthing as well aa everyone ia a gOOG o

of reality.

-

If it ia, t.b.en it 1s tulfilling a ur..Ique purpose; and, so, it is

in itself a good.

c.

Identitl.
Every man has an ident1t7 proper to hImself; yet, no nIS.n hps

attained. his rull Identit7.

Because he is a unique individual,

every man can s a7 that he has an identity. that he is somebody,
that he has who-ness, that ther-e is meaning for him in the terln
"I."

..Jho is

he,

Now, he is the integral

fulfil his unlque purpope.

whole

or

8'lU1l

or

hip striving to

"For the Self in ltp entlrety ls the

a self-representative orzec'I.lrrent prooess, and not the

mere last moment or stage of that pl-oces8. tt19
115 not his full identit7.

Hut the present ego

"I am not one wlth M1 own eternal in-

ae

is also the he who is in progress toward
an ideal self, the pert.ct fulfilment of his purpose. 2l
'l'herefor4l,

dividuatlity • •

both the past acts ot aelf-acquirtng and his limit point, his
self, give him his identit7.
direction.

pose

dOGS

Id~aJ

His ideal self gives his atriving

In hi. subjective sphere, the ideal selt does what purin the objective sphere.

The ideal self and unique pur-

pose are two ways at looking at t he a ame thing.

Both give directkl:

19 Ibid., p. 135.

2lPaul Runaell Anderson and Max Ha~old Flach,
20 Ibid ., p. 149.

America (New York:

Ph110S0P~ in

D. Appleton-Centurr Compan7, 1939), P. 5

.--
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and make poss1bls development 1n personal 1dentitJ.

There is, then, f'or each human being an identity peculiar to
him.

Beoause each has a unique purpose, he cannot become other

than the ideal selt which the Absolute w111s tor him.
Is to be or not to be.

Manis optlm

He cannot choose to be th1s or that.

moral choioes either help one on toward his goal or not.

All

It will

be s?en later t., han men do not have to have some sort of' supernatural revelation t

0

lee who the,. should be or what t

do in a partioular sltuetien.

he,. should

Beoause the ind! vi dual is si tuated

in one set of oircumatanc •• , there 18 but oae oorre.pond1ng perteet choIce tor htm at a particular time and place.

other ohoices

1n that situation mwt be le•• good than the one whioh would put
the ind1vidual in pertect harmoD7 with his communit7.

There are

man7 possible ohoices because the person i8 free to act to the extent t hat he w1ahe..

The possible choice. 'farry quant1tat1volr,

then, and not qualitativel,..

In short, tar an ind1vidual in a

g1ven circumstance there is ane ideal ohoioe and man7 01' loss
worth 1b ich, nevertheless, oan be termed good because the,- do approach the ideal.

Bad choices are tboae which appear on the con-

tinuum 01' pOBsi ble choices as rather distant from the ideal.

An

abaolutel7 bad choice i8 inconceivable, for no one oan so gp
agaInst him.elf aa to will evil per se

fo~

himself'.

Man. 18 g1 'fen his ldenti t7 as potenti a1 in the a ens e that he
has in himself a character which i8 unlike al170118 el •• 's.
character 1s ultimately

~at

makes him to be who he is.

That
It is not
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a fluid, . .plr1cal determlnation, which can be only 8uperrlclal to
the true Identlt,' of the purpose.

That ch.a.racter, which is de-

termin&d by the indlvldual's unique purpoae, is his core.
you posseas your Individualit7.

"In God

Your veI7 dependence is the con-

dition ot your freedom, and of' yom' unlque signitlcance. Il22
Man

is not given his identity a. a.ctual.

who-ness by exercising his free wlll.

He Jnuat acquire hil

Man becomfl:S who he is by de

liberatel,. choosing to be rather than not to be.

He

BlUst choose tc

be real, to pla, his role in reality, to fulfil hi. unique purpose
or to be pe tt7, to ceue to function as an integral part of realitlJ
to deny his purpose as his.
But.. too, you will know that you are a 8elf precisely
in so far aa you Intend to aeeomplish God fa w1ll by
becoming one, and that you are an individual preclsely
in so fu as y,u purpose to do TOur Father's buslness
in un1que fashion, so that In this !natant shall begin
a work that can be finished only in eternlt7,--a work
that, however cleaelT bound up it may be wlth all the
rest .of the dlvlne lite, still remains In its expression
distinguishable f'rom all this other 11fe. 2:3
The human self tor ROToe ls essentiallT moral.

In fact only

b.1 tunotioning as a moral agent does theaelt acquire actualit7.
The selt can d.velop an17 1n the 11ght ot to. Ideal self, on17
the shallav.ness ot the empirloal selt is seen

a8

whe~

lnadequate. 24 How

____
22Ro7ce, _Th. World• ____
and ...-..-.
the .;;:;.;;;;;;;,;;;;,0;.;;;;..;
Indlvidual,
II, 417.

23 1bld., p. 277.

-

~o.e. Judah Aronson, La Ph11oaopbie Morale

(Parl.,

Libralrl. P'llx Alcai;

19210,

p. 121.

De

--

Josiah Royce

the self'

OOlUsa

to an awareness of' its ideal will be taken up in a

later chapter.

Han is •• It-identical, then, 1n that he 1s a unique individual.

Man 1s aelt ... ldentit7ing in tb.at he mua t acquire for himself

his awn reallty.

D.

Person
Man is a person because he is aelf-conscious in that he is

aware of' himself as the directlon of his aot!v! tie •• 25

tihen ha

has evaluated the possible cour••• ot action in tbe light of' his
purpoae, he, then, can wl1l bis choice into act.
POI'

Royce, man i. not a mere tunctionarr, for each hUDlUl selt

is conscious ot Itself as a good 1a ltselt.

True, the actual ac-

quiring ot 1denti t7 wl11 demand tbat t he sell' function a8 an integral member ot the whols, which i. maniteat in one way by soclett'o
.evertheless, the functioning is not conoelved of as a good in itselt, but rather the indiVidual, alone, is a good in himself.

So,

alao, the Absolute as an individual, not as a collective system,
is a good In h1Juelt.

The t"unotloning of the Indlviduals, then,

ls necessary but a .econdary value, trom the point of v1ew of man.
The universe 1s not a vast mach1ne, some of whose parts happen to
be tree.
values.

The universe has in its compOSition persona, subsistent
Indeed, all the individuals in the un! vel's. are in

lWay consclous, and

110

are persons.

"The unoonscious we re ject,

--

n, 425.

2Saoy ce, 'Ihe World and the Individual,

-

80me
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becaUie our Pourth conception of Being forblds all
unconscious realltlea. n26

~ecognitlon

of

Man ia diatinctive aa a class of beings

because the specific purpose. ot each meMber are approximately slmilar.

Since man 1. the be.t known ot all tne cla8.ea, Royce con-

centrate. his phl10sopny on human belngs and admits h18 ignorance

ot t he other cl aaae ••
It waa pointed out earlier that R07ce .ees no contradlction
in retaining indivlduality tor that which Is a part of another individual.
expressions

So, then, men remain persons although the,. are onl,. the

or

the Absolute Person.

People comDlanl,. tend to forlllUlate their flrst concept of the
individual or self on an unreflectlve level where identit,. is in
terma ot the empirical, but the,. cannot rest 1n this naive pos1tiCII.
The,. usually choose one ot three further explana tiona, two ot wh1cb

are realistic, corresponding to the first concepticm of 'being, and
the third. idealistio, correspondlng to the fourth conception ot
being.

The first w &J' 18 directl,. empirical.

It holds that the

tull explanation ot a manta selt i8 on the empirical le.el, which
is given iDm1edlate17 in experience, and that there ls no other
27 This path fails to gl.e an account ot how it is that
le.el.
so_thing ot the 1ndl vidual aelt is permanent amid the flux of the
emplrioal world. 28 In other warda, it taila to give a full
26

ROJce,

~

World

27Ibld. , p. 2S7.
28;bid., p. 260.

!!!!

~

...In...d_i_v_i_d_u_a_l, II,

241.
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explanation of the aelf.

The aecond possible path. whioh leads beyond the initial
unretlecti ve conception of the selt, is the metaphysical.

The se11

1s here detined in terms of independence.

The majorit7 of philos-

ophers 1n the past have taken this route.

Royce cannot tollow

The sell' 1s not s. thIng. a compartmentalized entIt,-

Realism here.

e.g., a SUbstance.

29

B070e strongly- reruees to put t he ultimate

real1't7 ot the Indl"ldual In some airy entity or pr1noiple, \'lhich

oan only be alluded to but i8 ot lIttle I mport to t he existing ot
the indi"idual.
8.

prinoiple.

He Njects the notl.on of substanoe as being such

Also, t he idea of' Monads goes contra17 to Royoe's,

because it tails to "lew the indIvidual as one eonstltutlonal17
related to other.30

The material chasms, which tor that sort ot

realist derine individuality, separate indl"iduals

80

that commun-

tty .. Which :t.• an actual tact, 18 impossible.

With t he passIng at the realistie explane,tt, on of the sell',
~oyce's

own

aOmElS

torward:

"A Mean:t.:ng embodied in a consciOus

~1te.d3l This third path 1. the atrictly Idealistic one.

The

reaU ty ot the selt lies in 1 ts internal meaning, as fultl111ng

-

29Ibld., p. 268.

.3°Ibid ., p. 238.
31Ibid •

-

-
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'rhe fil'8t conception
herent 1nabl11 tJ tel give
has

or

beInt:.

beoflu•• of ita In-

satl.ta,et()!'1 definItIon ot the person,

ft

le4 HOlO. 'to formulate hll! own.

tIon 01" be1ng, M¥8tlclam,

HtH~,U.8»t,

d~

1"1D1ng th{; Individual ."ltt.

Tt. .eoond

a net rind

~ch

ot a

~m(l

third concep-

pl"ObleJl In de-

POI' Hyattc! am., the IncUv1dual 1a an

1llusion, a drea.m.32 . . thud conceptIon ot belng, CrItical !'tatlO1laUam, th.1nks that it ean tul17 explain the indIvidual self In
tere

or

Yalldltr w1.th Napeot to a. .,..tem.

aHoua ayatem

The a.l1" is an auton-

ot valId! t7.

The deteot at Cr1tleal Ratlo11ll11am l1ea In the
oon••queno.. of 1 ta ....ntlal17 abat;l"aot and
impersonal v1e" of BelDa. The Selt, In tilts
••n•• , 1. a l ..w 1'&the~ tban a 111". J and", type
ot .y~atenc8 ratDt$r than an IndIvIdual.
ROIO. wlanes to retam all tb.e oharacter1.tlcs ot a

r-ree,

Bo01al, self-developing .. tt, While he aeee thB 8elt'. reallt7 1n
a ooncrete

.,.ten,

tna Absolute.

;~nd a1nce the Self Is prec1sely, tn ita whol. . . . , the
oone.lou. and loten'lonal hl:f'l1ment ot this d1 vtr. purpose, in 1 ts own unl'lu val', the 1ndiv1dual vll1 or the
Self 18 not wholly 4et.nd..ne4 bJ .. poVN' that taah10na
It a. cla, 111 t •• Moneel and that
call.4 ("rOd's Wl11J
but, OIl the contra..." what the Sol.t 11l Ita wholene •• willa
le, just 1n 80 tar, Ooc!tfl 11111, and Is IdentIcal w1th
one of tb.e -aRT ex,pro•• lona ll1PUed b, a alasle dt vlne
purpc ae, eo that, tOr! the re••ona already .et forth., In
SGn.ru, In tbe 010a1,. leoture or the toregolna ••1'1•• ,
thct ~.lt 1s 1n ita lnnermoat lndf.vlc:lt.lallty, not an 1n44tpend4tn', but .'111 a Pree Will, til io11. in 110 tar!
no external Mastar, de.pite 1ta un1tJ with t he whole ltr.
ot Oed, and d•• pite 1ta dependenoe 1n coun,le.. WAT. upon

'.$

own.

12I bId., p. 284 •

-

•

33 Ib1d ., p. 28b.
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Nature anc1 upon 1 ta tel lows, tor .9.r1th1na e.¥Qept
the Indlv'"duallty ~.nd unlqu.nesl ot ita 11!•• -''+
rille .h.l.&man selt Is an individual person having a unique ld.n-

tlt7.

Man 1s an expreualon of the Abaolute,

p'eol ••1, beitlti the

DU1i\l'1

that n. 18.

i'etuna AM tlnda b.1maelt.
trie questilon

UIiQ' be

)low

)I-·n in being in the ADsolute

aakod in wonder 1II1th R07ce:

----------------34 Ib14., pp. 286-81.
F

3Stb1d •• p. 21.

mants reality 1.

that an anaW8t- haa been t'orm.ulated

l:nan rqatel'J ia the" than th4t Ego?")S

-

,..t,

"What Qeepezt hu-

THE flliALITY

or

'I'HE: HUMAl( SELF

The p\U'po•• of thi. ohapter 1. to indicate the .elt'. place
in 1t8 world.

top 80708,

'the lfottld and the 1ndl"ldual are oorrelatlve terN

The

wo~ld

18 a eonatltutlve ot tbe ••It, and the eelt

18 an ••••ntial In the _ke-up ot the aotual world.
~.taph7al0.

of the

~r.on

... t be . .en In

IIlOf"e

Row, ROTce'.

cemeNte dimenaiona.

It haa been all_a that according to the Fourth Conoeptlon
~ln&

an enti'1 haa -lDa cmlT

all •

Itegl'&tlon cf tl» tinlte embodiment.
~t

tult1b1ent of purpos..

or

lng to hay. certain purpotuta tuln1l.... 1

bel~

tle becomes.

by ehoo..

Aoccrd1ng to thet meta-

ph7s1e_, then, tlw hUtllflll person 18 essentIally soot.1.
w1 th the bwnan

The In-

PW'Poae fOl'l'ia the expresalO11

the Absolute, who willa tbe f1nlte inatance. into

.lan _fIlth•• lses hima elf

or

CODJrluni tJ,

the

The more a
:ariON

a perflOn

Dl thue un! tins h1ma81t w1 til ttl 8 exps-. . slon of t h.

lb801ute, the per.on unlteshimselt to the Absolute, hi. will be~o.e.

ea.

with tba Absolute's.

a

Roree aa78 that the selt haa 1dentitT In

80

tar as it can be

relat•• to the apparent polar ••ructtre ot Nall'7.

lRc7ce. The World and the ID41v1dual, II,
__

--

'Ibid.,

p.

-.-._

r

13S.

47

4S2.

The .elt 18,
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on the nne hand, identIfied 1n ita relation to the Absolute; and,
on the other hAnd, it Is identified 1n ita relation to the world,
which 18 othep finite selv&..

"Con•• quentl,., eYtin what ie most

lnd.! .,ldual about t he Self' n."81' appefll'S exeept In thft closest connection With What transcends both the meaning and the l'.fe
tln1te indlVidual. ttl

or

the

Ro,"ce does not yj.ew the•• poles aa d18june'"

ttv., but rathep a8 identical, In a a.n.8 pecul1ar to Royea.

The

Absolute tinds its ex.pNs.lon, and so tta NAllt7. 1n tlnlt$ selv. .
The hU1lAn person 1a Buch an expres.ion.
Ord1naJ'lly. 1 t 1. C(lmwnl,7 agreed, God (or t he Absolute)
d<.B a not 411'.ot17 tall man what he vould 11ke hi. to do and,
ito beoome.
~atur.l

80,

ROTe_, too, telt t b,sI.t cli.ine reYelatlona were n¢ the

meana ftl' making tlw ehoicea of dally lite.

Slnee m.an 1a

en expt-eaalon \d..thin an expression, he !lUst be in harmonY' with the
lether taotcra In the expN .. 1on.
~t

the Abaolute, MAn need only to

'1'0 8fte hi. !'Ole In the expression
app~clat.

the world around him.

~he world and the indiyIdual ape c01Telatlves. not lsolated trOnt

one another as 80ml naiYe reaUatlc philosoph1 •• would
Man

1lU8t

to h.uman •• lves.

say, aoelall1

relat~ul

.3Ibld., p. 169.

S~eI.t1,

tor 10TC., 1s not It.-

The whole un1vttrse 1s a society, that is to

.81"•• wbloh are Indiv1dual :tactors In the

totel expression or the Absolute It

-

theM.

fit into the aoclal etructu:re, "'h.Ich 1s hi. W'ol"ld,

I t he i8 to acquire hi. Identity_
~te.

hJJ.1,te

The ••It in the animal klng40a

49
p0881bl1' _., be a whole genWl, rather t han a pl!:l.rtlculs.r inferior;

1'1owe.,e., ROlce 1.&"8. euch speculation for lack of ev1.aeu<..;&.
The prlma1'7 society fOJ.'l man, o'bYloual1 enough, 1s t b.6 human
80cle,,_

To aoquiN hi. lndivld.ual goal and Identity. each man

muat find his place wI tll hi. feUow men.

IJ1 the naturally harmon-

loua expre.sion ot .001e',. men can help one another find theIr

penonal rultllme nt. as the, compo.t te17 uhle". the purpo.. of b
Absolute, who haa w11led tbat humanIt,. be part

part ot hi. Identltr.
R07ce, tbAJn, •••• _n not

.tand 41YI4e4.

a.

or

bi. expNaalon.

1D.4ependent .ntlt18. lil1ch can

He ••e. them as ontloally bound inatanoes ot the

bsolute. who need one anott». 1n ord.,. to haYe 1;helr own beina.
The brotherhood ot man I . no po.tlotlg\1r.

.a.eno. of _okSad.

t ... ROJce.

It 1. the

That tllt ¥erld chao. ot' earl, twentIeth cen-

tU17 hu-.nlt7 was tatal to ROJo. 1s not 8urpl'181ng.

The

.oli.arU~7

telt b7 all.

ot _n Is such that the tailings

one are

In fact, the abort-com1ngs 01' one . .abel" 1n tbe

achieylng the expre ••ion ot the Absolut.
by

or

~t

be compensated tor

another.
In the human aoole'1, all"."d1 atruoturea bJ' h1ato.t'J, 1n wh1c

the ••It 18 p1aoe.. tn. •• It IIm8t .eUtah out hi. ro1. and then p

it.

Thus, be acquire • • elth.oo4, ldentt'7.
Sineo hi. 14ent1t,- f.• an express!.' ot the Abaolute, the hu-

man •• It' l* lea•• baa the eternal 8iani.tioanoe ot t te Absolute.

That man is ••••nti.ll,- temporal in no wa,. d1sparage. hia value

or

.s a person. tor ho haa an intricate part l,n tllf" eXf,reeeion

the

bobsolute.
The communi t7 to which the .elf is related i8 not Just the

!nov ex1sting one.

ot

now~

true.

The selt 1s in :relation tot he statie cOl\'lmUIllt7

But, also, it 18 1n relation to the coaaunlty ot tk»

paat uut that ot the future.
~bsolut.

All thoa. finite expn.slona ot the

mien preceded the selt' have oontributed to the identlt7

of that Belt.

All tho•• expres.lon. to come are 1n

pended on this

8611

SORe

way de-

"ror their Identity.

R07ce b7 no £leana intended that hi. ph110sopb7 should stand

aloot fl90a the world ot _n.

There would be no purpose tor an

"ivory-tower" phllo80pbJ In R07C.'. syst...
tbing oannot be real.

Without a purpose a

In his later philosoPh7. R07ce spent much

of bis ettorts 1n 6xpl1clt17 applf1ns tde metap}q81oa to t he world

about h1m.

ae did thR.t to such an extent tbat M8n7 interpreters

ba.e t'ailed to apprec1 ate hi. under17lq _tapn,alc8.

cerns

anr'man

the

Plac.,,,4

first ouaes to an awaNne.s ot his lnneJ'

OOlll'.l!Wl1 tJ'

0011-

more tban his place 1n the world. and the Reaning ot

the world in wblch he 1s to tind tM.
}I{aft

"What

1n whlch be nnds hi_elt.

comes to se1t-oonso1ousness t

80

tar aa I

_anina

"Iobod,- amongat

1m_.

through

WI

men

except under the

perslaten' 1nfluence ot' his 800181 tellows."> When he hns found a
propol' plaoe tor hi.elf in hi. ooJUlUl1 t7, the man bas oome to his

-

4Ibid.,

p. 1.

'Ibid., p. 261.

Sl
rat appreciation or b1aaelf' .a a reel •• 11'.

Now that rut 1.

wakened to the realIty of hi. being a unique parson, tbs
Ina to aoquire turth8tt identIty.

D~

be-

He a ••• hi_elf as a vulue 1n

maelf, although hi. tunetloninr, wl11 alway. be 1n the oontext 01'

eomnun!t7.

Bo strives to achieve him

total perfection.

~t

~oal

of totnl identIty.

trl.. point, he hAa come to a direct ap-

reeiation of' the .Abaolute'8 will.

When the man will. his Identlt

e haa confottWtd his wl11 to the Absolute's.

That the wl11 of the

baolute 18 compatIble with man ought not to atartle one.
oat natural.

When man tztUl,. wl11a, hi. vl11 i8 the Absolute'.

In him.
$0

-01' course,

It 1.

I\..s the

mt.D

aohiev•• hi. ideal goal of perfect

too ln that act does ttle Absolute achie •• ita .elf'ho

tram the paint

01' view

ot the Absolute-a et.ttnity, be

• his full identit, already expre ••• 4. 6
The man, bJ' tNly 11.ing In b.1m ",ovld, haa

brld>,~.d

n eommunicntlon betveen t he Absolute and h1r.welt.
ppNclate the world, then hllUtelt, and

80

t he gap

Pi:rat be tI'lUst

the Absolute.

Man oome

o an appreciation nt God's (the Absolute's) wl11 not through divine illum1nntion or any etfo%·ts 1n prayer.

ing as himself, his
Sl1"t

or

t~ue

aelf.

~hat

he Can

He co_s to it b,- I1v
r.eo[~1ze hl~elt

1s

manta conscious nature.

!he ideal selt of e"e1"';1 person I. pl"eaete1"mned b7 the A.beo-

ute.

A8 a person particIpate. in the world, whioh 18 t be expre8-

10n ot't he Absolute' a wtll, he f'l.tl.t'11s h.i8 1deal.

6 Ibld." p. 148.

The Ideal can
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p.ever be totally fulfilled, tor if that were ;0 happen tJ.i.on the
~ontinued

exlstenee ot the person would be without purpose.

purpoa e a belng cannot exlst.

~ut

rhe task ot the philosopher i8 to bring t
~8

With-

0

11&1t that there

more to reallt7 than tne "world ot description."

He must tell

pi8 tellow . .n the good neW8 that thelr 8eemingl,. lruslgn1ticant,

.....748.7 lite 18 of equal 81gn1tieanC6 as the gigantic cosmos, tta.t
in ht.aelt man bas a personal dIgn1t7 whIch he eternally gaios tor
n1...1t.

"The w8.J ot retlectlon 18 long.

mon

ignorance is dark and tangled. • • • •

hWIlHn

The torest ot our comThe philosopher,

in the world ot thought, 18 by 4.st1111' tore vel" a trontiersman. n7

fhe phiJ,osopher t s 1'01. In the world 18 to lead men trom their prim-

1t1ve attitude of seltish 1nd.pendence to the aoclal awarenea. ot
their eternal significance.

Ob.loua17, then, the phil080pher can-

not be content to bull. an ab8traot S78te., wblcb. can hard17 enlighten the exoteric world.

The philosopher muat apply hi8 meta-

phy8ios to t he needs ot his da7.

Therea he will tind the teat tor

nis philoaop):q'.

.............

In The World and the Individual, II, R07ce !.a con..
~.t

_~

t

....

•

eamed. with de.,eloping the metaphy'8ic. which he will applr in hi.
Ilater phl108opl'Q" to the conc"te.

An example of that would be hi.

IProgPllm tor international lruauranee.
~a'1

S. propo.ad It a s a p088ible

to 4et.,.. war and to _n4 transgressions in a manner t l tted to

~---------------,-7Ibid., pp. 2-3.

-

5.3
rational men.

8

The rather cold, abstraot, metaphys1cal term

-

translated in the religious sphtu'8 by the term God.

'~Absolu.te"

9

is

When one.

metaphysically speaking, strives to acquire his ident1ty by

~ul

t1ll1ng the Absolutets purpose. he ia trying to do Ood's will.
The harmony of the lnd1 v1dual wi th t he whole Is virtue.

The apprech·

at10n of the internal meaning ot another is love.

The solidar1ty

ot t he ind! vidual. in one is the bond ot ohal'lty.

The total iden-

titJ 01' the person In the Absolute 8.ppears in the relig10us sphel'e
1n the torm 01' the total depen4ence ot the creature.
1s helpless without the sustain1ng fUnotion1ng ot God.

needs God both tor hia continued existenoe and

tOI'

The ereature

The

crea~

allot ,his acts.

Without God the creature can have no ident1t7, to!' he could not be t
~he

tru. imit7 01' the b.wrtaD. cOJIIIRwi tT 11es 1n t he World of

lppreclation.
~nd1 viduals

Only by becoming aware ot the 1nternal meanIngs 01'

cen a person beoome alrare ot his own internal meaning.

pnly then can he unite h1mselt in anT meanIngful va,. to t he
munity.

By

s. doing. he becomes M:mael1'.

The community is

COM-

a con-

stitutive 01' the individual, juat .. a the individuals form t he eom-

Inunit,-.
A man oan best come to an appreciation cf himself in a
8Ralph D1 Pasquale, O.F.M., The Sooial DimenSions of the
Pbilo •• phJ' ot Josiah ~olhZ (Rome: '"1'in£!t1e!um Atnenaeuui"Antcmia!Ull
"aculta. phII'oaoehIea, l' a •• ~ Lau.rean-l 41, 1961), p. 200.

-

--

9Royce, The World and the Individual, II, 11.
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relatIonship with another man.

10

Through social contact man pro-

gre.aively.appreciates internal meanings, reality.

In his prim1-

ti ve atage man t ends to have the naive attitude that tacta are all
is to truth.

~here

Only upon becoming retlective does a man out-

/

grow that naivete.
Faots are the invariants

~ich

appear in natural phenomena.

J1hey are t he links by Which men are able to communicate.

"Por·

only by means ot their common relations to the natural phenomena
are the men able to give, one to another, detinite signals as to
what their intentions are, or to detine extensive plans ot action

~n social17 intelligible terma. nll Savages viewed tacts as empodied spirits.

Their animiatic

th8o~

preserved the notion ot

Boc1al relation between the aubject and t he tactual object.
~lized
~o

I1he

man bas alienated tacts by categorizing them.

Civ-

Hia impatiema

master tacta has rendered them devoid ot ..~sonal signiticance.
need ter communication baa atandardized the categories tor men.

rhe attitude, Which aoon tollows, ia that the whole ot reality ia
ntelligible through categorie..
~ion

A man needa only greater preci-

in cla.sifTing to cOJllprehend a tact.

Error in the catesorizing ot tacta becomea evIdent when the
~ategorie. cannot be applied to the social aituatIon. 12 The
lOIbId., p. 170.

-

-

llIbld., pp. 183-84.
12Ibid ., p. 185.

5S
"Human Experience" is the reservoir for ractual truth.

The ulti-

mate cr1terion, then, is not any sense-experience, but rather the
social "ought. 1t

It a faot ought to rit the human experience, then

it is a true faot.

The civilized social consciousness is the apt

judge tor tactual knowledge, rather than an individual's arbitrary
An example of this would be round in the co_unity of a par

view.

ticular soience.

ot periodicals I

The men ot that scienee 8ubmt t, through t he media
leotur~.8,

seminars, their opinion to the alread.,-

existing body ot knowledge.
Because natural phenomena appear as stable and prediotable,
~n

think that the)" know ltlat matter 1s.

They would explain the

unusual, mind, in terlll8 01'" the usual, matter.

They regard matter

as a liteless, stable meohanism controlled by rigid laws of benavior.

Royoe proposes:

"Suppose, after all, the. t this stable

appearanoe were a delusion."l.3
In Josiah Royce'. philosopbJ, as in
tion of matter muat be handled.

a~

idealism, the ques-

Ultimately, Royce w111 say that

material things are 01'" the lame sturf that ndnd 1s.
ihints at that:

Hegel, too,

"the other is mere17 the expression of the tnner.,;Lli

ROTce maintains that the empirical sciences deal with pbtnom~na

only-

~recls1on

TheT never attain the thing-in-itself, although their
and aoeuraOT In categorizIng may lead

-

U8

to think that

IJIbid., p. 213.

14 G. w. P. aegel,

Bal11ie (2d

The Phenomenology or Mind, trans. J. B.
.d., Hew YorK:
MacmIllan
p. 301.
dompiiiy~61),
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they ai'S rea.chlng the ultima. tft real! ty of things.

Royce,

are~1ethod8

of bookkeeping.

J'LlSt as t he work of an ac-

countant gives a clear pioutre ot some aspeots
do the sciences indIcate the world.

Sciences J tor

o~

business, so too

But the arbitrary system. of

the aocountant ce1.'talnly does not map on ontological realit1; likewise, neither do the scientifio s1stems.
Th. sciences hay. eatrange4 matter trom mind.

on

a close

inspection of matter it is seen that it is similar to mind in four
respecta.
cesses.

(1) In matter,

8.S

in mind .. ttl.re are irl"eYeralble pro-

(2) In the elements or matter, as among minds .. there is

inter-communication.

(3) MattAr, as woll as mind, forms its be-

havior in patterbs or habits, which eventual17 give way to new

(4) The process.s of both matter and mind are evolu-

patter.aa.
tionary.

From the above empll"loal findings 107ce reoeive. three im-

pres.iona.

(1) The contrast between mind and mat; ter. has been

greatly exagger&tted.
~con8oious

I

a.,. that t here is

nature; at moat_ it may be 8aid tha.t some beings are

incommunicative.
~otual11

(2) It 1s illegitimate to

()

Perhaps the so-oalled material beings are

consoious beings who are related in time on a larger scope

than human beings (e.g._ our million 1ears may be a second for
them) •

In an1 case. accordtna to the FOUl"tb Conception of Be Ina an

unoonacious datwa--i •••• a at.rial be1ng--cannot be.

"The Un-

conscious we reJeot, because our l1'ourth Conception of Belng forbids
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8.11 recognition of unconscious realities. ttl "

Echoes of Teilhardta

rtDt10n of radial energy come to mind:

In the world, nothin, could ever burst forth as
?rnar-aoross tfii
erent tnreanolds auccessri.ll
traversed
iiOlutlon (howey.r crItIoa! that Se)
;nlch his not atreadf--exIs£ea In an oSscure an~

& aIr
pr!mornil fhl • tl'he organi'eniCr not exlai'ia' on
eartli trom
a first moment at Whish it was possible,
it would never have begun later."

Royce admite that there are real entitles apart from the

subjeot.

~mowlng

W.Mt gives objects their indiylduallty is not

natter, but purpose.

Unlike the idealism ot Berkeley, ROlce main-

talna that na tUl'e is just as real, and real 1n t he same way, a.s

nen are real.

"Nature for us Is real In precisely the sanse In

:rhloh our f'l!llow-r'!Bn are real. "17
~:reate

~ate

The Absolute, then, does not

com:m.on ll1usions In men'. minds so that t hey can communlThe 111ua1ons here in'Volved come 1"rom men's

among themselvee.

ninds the_elye..

Hen 1"001 the.elve. into thinking that t he World

p1" Deaor'-ptlon i8 the whole or reality.
~eet.

Men bY' categol"1z1ng ob-

into tacts 'Void objects of internal meaning.

Oby1ousl1, then. it a man grows intofar .a
~er

of hls commtm1

loa.

lnd,

t,..

he cannot 11 VEl

sole~

~

becomes a mem-

In the World of De8cr!p-

Indeed, 8ciences tend to estrMge h1n from his communi ty
80.

Only by coming to an appreciation

from himself.

or

the

l>Royce, The World and the Individual,
II, 241.
;,;;,;0.;;.
_

T

____

.:.;;;;;;;...................

l6plerre Teilhard De Chal"dln, !l1le Phenomenon of Man (New
Harper and Brothers, 19$9), p:-T.l.
- -

-

--------

l7Ro1ce, The World and the Individual, II, 236.
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internal meaninGs ot others and of himself. dCJe& a man Join his
cor<Jmm1ty.

By r-efleotlve InterpretHt10n he laborlous17 approache8

an awarene88 of %"eal!t,.

Perhaps, at t hili po1nt, Royce is not too

tar distant trOln Aqu:inas f contemple.tion.1B
It can now be 8een that inter-personal relations had an
solutel,. necessa!7 place in Rcree'lI phllollop!l7.
communication only wi, th otber men.

~b

MNl hPs mutual

In interpretation, that pre-

cesa bY' ttb.leh truth 1s t'ound as the intf!rpretere cut oft one an-

other's 8ubjeotlYe biaaee. men come to the World ot Apprecintlon.
Therein, they find their

own fulfIlment.

Tau. an interpretation 18 a relation which no~
only Involve. three te~. but brinsa them into a dete:rm1nate order. One of the th.ree tel"Nl is the interprete., a .econd tera i8 the object--the peNon or
the meaning or t he taxt--vh1ch 1s interpreted; th..
tb1~ la tbe peraon to whom the interpretation 18 addreaa.d. l 9
Interpretation .eeka an object which ia eaaentlalll .p1rltual. The &b,Jaa ot ab8trao~ conoeption
8ays ot this object, rt 1. not in me. The heaven
ot gl1ttering 1...01&cles Which perception turnlsh••
anewel'a the queet by aaring: It 1s not 1n me. Intel'pNtatlon aa181 It 1a nip tbee--e.en in thine
lSsaat Thoa.• .lfla!nfle, 5U11!'ta Contra Gentiles, e d. Anton O.

Pesta (Baalo Wrltm,. of Saint !noma., tf. Rew!ol'i: Random Howse,
1945), Hi. III, ohap. !lXv!!, pp. 59-60.
Salnt IJ,'homaa Aquinas, On the Tl'Ut11 ot the Catholic l"lth,
Summa 0.on.~ra aenti,les tra.ns7""'ltlll'l(,!'. F. AnderiO'n rd~aen-cI~:r, Yev
"
IX 0 ..
fm-gO- looka, t95b),
Bk. II, chap. 8.3, art. 28, pp. 280-81.

.1"

Saint Thomas Aqulnaa, SU'CIIU- Th.eolo:,iicae, fld. De Hube1s, Rl1-

lUaJ't, P. Paucne.. , o.P. (oum i.itu ex reoenaIone Leonina, rr&urln1,
ItalYI Mal'lettl, 1948),
fI:;;. q. 1B6, ~irt. " PP. 838-.39.

!!!!.lli

19Jo81ah Ro,ree, The ~obleft o~ Cbr1atianltz. Vol. II, L~e
turea XI: and XII, ClaaiYi X;;rlcan~loao,Kel'.' ad. Max H. Fisoh
lIev York: Appleton-cent\U7-drorl'lI, Ino •• 4JSI). p. 218.

hNI.M;} but shows us, through manl.restlng the verr

nature ot the object to be sought, what geneNl oondIt10na must be met it anJ one 1s to Interpret a
genuine lip to an undeztatand.1ng mind. And Withal,
interpretat10n seekS .. c1tr out or 81gbt, the homeland where, perean.oe, we leam to under. tand one
another . . . . .

The

example of an inter-personal relation• .b1p i. that

p~lme

pi the hu.sband-vife.
~ol'lle

to a

t!'\llt

In marriage, R01ce .8.18, the partners muat

appreciation of .ach other' 8 intel'l'lal meanlns_

Phen, the,. so unite the. . . lv•• that PUI'pos •• become one purpose
"n the Absolu.te.

their Identitle., t Mn, are conetltuted by the

:tarltal relatlODship.
:me another.

'rills Is theIr love, tot Ind the.elve. In

For one partner to will good to himselt, to will

aore Identit,. tor himself by striving to achieve hi. purpose, hI •
.. deal .elt, n8ce ••al'117 d..and. tba t be wIll gOod and moM Iden~itJ

to hI8 partner.

The fultilment ot hie pwtpose I. the t\11-

P,1111ng ot her purpose.

A concrete representation ot the marl tal

Ioelatlonahip fI2IIlJ' be s.en 111 Slgrld tfrld.et's 1tPl.tl.11
~

;;;;~_v..;.,ra
.........na
..........cl....a....t ...t ...
e ....
r,

whIch. the wite Kl'latln de.elops 111 her IdentltJ .. a abe tlt8 her

"it.'.

purpose With her huaband'. and children's.

Aa man by appreCiation extend. h1mael.t turtber ts-om juat

l11_elt to
~he

the

whole ot %"$&11 tr, he .e•• that his personal good 1.

good ot the whole _

III no wa,

~orJ.

-

20 I bld., pp. 221-22.

0&Jl

the two good. be contradle-
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ponstituted by the diarchial principles Wilieh are self and world.
~n

21

the sense that the self is determined by the free will of the

~bsolute,

the self is a totally transcendental principle.

But,

secondaril)", in t he sense that t he self finds expression onl,. in
the world, it is a totally immanent principle.

Because of its

transcendental character, the person oannot be defined.

Bowever,

as the self becomes 1Duaanent to t he world, an .appreciation of its

inner-

uaning can be grasped.
Ifhe principles

ot t

he person function in two planes of real-

~ trt

the World ot Appreciation and t he World of Description.

~orld

of Appreoiation has two aspects,

!fulfilment.
~

willing and its consequent

The partioular act of t he will gives the persons only

partial consciousness

~he

The

ot the .elt as it appears at the instant.

total will place. the person in the eternal scheme as a selt

fultilling a purpose.
The d.e.d, or t he tulfilment of will,
in the co_unit,..

0

an be carried out onl,.

In the coamnity of nature, the deed must tit

the internsl meanings of beings.

In the human communi ty, the deed

must join the person in a greater participation with his fellow
!men, who harmonioua17 express their wllls b7 d .eda and, so, embody
the Absolute's Will.
The World of Description haa two levels.

The scientific

2~o a great extent the philosophJ' ot Luigi Sturzo parallels

R07C. 's on this doc trine of t he human person.

Luigi Sturzo, The True Lite, trans. Barbara Barclay Carter
"(London: Geoffrey sl.s,"""!lii' ~elUU7 Press, 1947), p. 152.
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level MUst be appreciated
S1ste..

t~

what it Is, i.e.# a bookkeeping

f{en must not entrust all truth to the sclences.

sclences lack any awareness ot internal meanings.

1'he

Theix- fol'mS are

detex-m1ne4 b1 the Interest ot the scientiats, not by anr lsomorp
with reallt7.

~h.

sciencea see man as a determined machine 1n

It

leaus.-ettect trameworkJ and, ot cour•• , the .01ence•••e only independent men apart trom the human oommunit7.
The oODlJ.'llOn-s.nae level 18 nalve.

It branches out into dog-

matic metaphl'slos wlth its .tres. on it. -truth ot independent em-

pirIcal tacts and Into m,stlclsm, whlch cannot be substantIated.
The human person la oonstituted b.J Its Ide.l .elt and the
And, so, ROToe baa entitled his great t18taphysical work
Wox- ¥

!..!!.S t2!. .;,I_nd.-i...v;.,;;l....d_\la
.......
l.

CHAPTER IV

SOME PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAI SELF
Bow that the basic structure ot the human person has been
seen, this chapter will look at some ot the person's properties,
twhich make it possible tor him to tunction.

The three properties

unum, verrum. bonum (one, true, good) will be taken aa a hand,.
lohtn. tor bringing out the person'a unity, reality, and volition,
although Royoe does not use them.

ot oourse, the transoendentals

~1th

Royce do not spring from an existential prinoiple; and, so,

~h.,.

must not be con1"uaed with the properties seen in the Scbalas-

~lc

context.

Then, finally, under volition tne lreedom and immor-

calitr ot the person, which acoording to Josiah Rorce are derived
rrom will, will be considered.
It will be pointed out that 1n Rorce's philosopnr the three
rranscendcntal properties formall,. imply one

an~~her.

These im-

~11cations

are so strong in Ro,.ce that he doe. not make the three

~roperties

explicitly dIstinct, tor he in no way bases AnT distinc-

lona on oognition and, correspondingl,., on intrinsic principles of
being.

.aturally, then, wIthout such distinctions the three

ranlcendentals will tend to ruse formall,. into one.

Since Ro,.ce

lid not delve deepl,. into epistemology, he naturall,. does not de~lne

"true" as relate4 to intellect. Theretore, he linds no need
62

6)
o detine, in Ju.xtapositlon to "true," ugood" as !'elated to will.
thermore, he ca.n derine
xi.tential Judgment
be ane.

01'

f1

one" wi thout reference 81 ther to an

to sense-experience, becau.se eve'l'7

Universal Ide.a, he aaY8, are true aa

t1'\'Ut
Indlvid~

but as intent10nal ther are only arbItrary vehicles tor
Sinoe Royce 1. working In eS8entiallsm--that i& to

sar,

does not posit an intrinsic principle of a being tor its aot ot
xiatlng--the transcendentala take on the characteristics ot CuncI.e., wa7S ot operation, and lose their ontological status
peculIar ch8l'acters ot exlstents.

Since much has alreadJ' been

I

aid concerning one under the

onslderatlona ot individuality and ident1ty, it wIll be only

r1et11 regard.d here.
In Rorce'.

cont.~t.

one

mar

be said

to be that characteria-

at a .elt which distinguishes It tram all otner aelves.
61ns. or lIelt, tor ROlce, i8 one.
~loh

Each

It bas an Ident1t7 all lts own

makes It an individual, While at the same time It finds 1ts
in relation to the world.

The union ot the .elf with the

no waf contradiota the selt·s personal Ident1tr.
a one and only one notion applioable to a Stilt which 18

om appreoiation, ot
ta internal

OOUl~s.,

and not trom abstractIon.

.an1Da. No two selves can have

There
d.~lved

That 1s

the same internal

It ROTC. adndtte4 a oyoll0 theo17 ot hlatol7, then
pelve8 would no longel' be one.

But he

tlat17 denies such a view
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ot history, 1 and each self retains its uniqueness.

If through

repetition all the formal notes of a self were found in another
self" there would be absolutely nothing to di!'ferentiate them. Hlstory is linear. The aelf has a pa8t, aa well as its present_ whicl
gives it a unique role to play in the progression of the Absolute'.
expression, the world.
To be a 8elt, or in other words a being, one must strive by
his own choice to achieve his ideal self.

To be one, to fulfil

oneta unique role in the world, one must be free, that is to S8.Y',
one muat be able to ecquire the good of his own being.
good.

~lies

~he

One 1m-

To be one 1s the object of the selt's will.

It is

good desired.
Our doctrine of individualitY' demands that every Selt
shall be in 80me respect tree. Our doctrine ot the
unity ot Beina implies that all Selves are known, without any true .eparation, in the organism ot a single
world 11te. And 80 flU" from there being an;}" opposition
between the.e two aspects ot our idealistic realm, they
are .t~ictl;y reciprocal aspecta. The 2 0ne World and the
tree tRdividual implr each the other.
"Individuality is a catego17 of the satistied Will.")

~uch

As

the proper way to come to an appreCiation ot individuality

~ould

b. through an activity ot the will, viz., love.

~ows

another as an individual when

he

lo".s him or her.

World and the Ind1 vidual. II, 437.
-The.393.
-p•

p.

432.

ane best
When one
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loves. he loves this individual and no other. Then. no other can
take his or her place for him.
thinking prooess taken a a •
it,.. ,,4

\.len.

"BUt I can

MVElr

discover. by m'f

what constt tutes their ina! vidual-

Thus 1" i8 tJaat tor the hWUUl mind. wi th 1 ts dis tinct runc

tiona of' knowing and w11Una. Indlv1duallt7 v111 always remain a
uvateJ7, 11'1ng be10nd the centin.a ot det1nlt1ona.

Gabr1el Marcel

so_tIme atter R07ce f s death. v111 also exalt the ind1vidual aa a
t;

mrster" Which stand. above 80ciological oategori.s.*

Although one 1n Royc.'. 8ystem logically ltapllea good, tru.e
~ill

be taken under oonaideration now tor rea.QQ. ot

~xpedl.noy.

sinoe the consideratIon on the good will be mol'e involved th.an that

Ion the tx-ue.

To oomplete the 0Tcle. good iJaplles tJtue. Ii. true 1m-

It Will be .een later how th1. work. out.

plles one.

True, tor loree, meana to tunction .s a partial or total exPNS8iOll ot the Abaolute'a total expresalon.

All truth is &roundttC
6 The truth of tacta 1s detePrd1Ded b.J "OUsht. H7 Thoae
in W111.

faot. are real WhIch enable one to tultll b1. purpose.
~xpPe •• Ion

Sinee the

ot the Abaolute 1. compoae4 ot harmonized lndividuals,

-

4Xb1d •
SGabrlel Mareel, The !lat8~ ot BelBi (2 vols., oateway ed.;
ph1oaSOI ael117 aegner,Compari7,9bO").
'A parallel with Royce'. notion ot truth may be round in
'utaela's reotitudo.
Anselm, BIt veritat_, Vol. I ot 028r. Omnia, ed. Prior at Abba.
~eco.n1s (Seooo"l!, IlljSJ. chap. 1", pp. 180-81, chap. v!I.'"P. 1.0;.

7ROJoe. p.

41.

here oan be no conflict in true facts.

If a fact ought to be, lr

apropos, then 1t 1s true.

on

the other

hAmu,

in the World of Appreoiation, tho truth

t tnternal meaning. 1. alao derived trom w1ll.

What a self 1.

n 1ta inmost .a.enoa 1. d.taradne4 01 the will ot the A.bsolute.
~elf.

hen one tr1e. to appr.olate the ultimate re.11t7 of a
e.kina to

mow

an expre •• lo11 or Will.

So 1 t 1s that

iii.

he 1.

purely In-

elleotual appx-cach oan not oome to tbe l'u11 tl'Uth of I'.all.ty.

Nal &ppreolat.1oa, one mUltt vollt1onallJ grup the
• to. &7, he III18t love the other aa

0JltI

one.

and,

.0,

'I'b.at

who is rult'lll1ng a dia-

inct pur-po•• 1n the Ab80lute IS expre •• ion.
vo 1n tn.

othtu.~.

Fer

Such lov ..' binds the

alao draws eaoh into a greater particlpa-

ot' Naliq.

Abstractions

~r. determined

by the interest

ot tbe knower. 8

a penon cl..81£1.. taota i8 to"l11 up to hi. choice.

The

ten8ts which hi. world gives h1a guide. bis seleotion or eate-

However, 1t must not
ana t1cUa. al'bltrar1ne...

be

thought that tbla subjectivism

On the contra17, the enoia. wbich the

ubj••• makes tor ola.allieation 8hould be that moat apt in help-

ns

hi. aohie.e bi. PW'po...

The

"ought,"

then, whioh

r lows

.f1"Om

ot atandard objectlv1ty tar tacta D.r
ot the .ubJe.t, not the Obj80t. 9

be Abaolute, 1naurea a kind

-

8lbId .,

-

p.

Sl.

9Ib1d ., p. ,2.
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Tempors.llt7 iabound up in the war that men know realltr.

The Absolute, on the other hand. sinoe he 18 in etern1t7, knowa
a.ll real1ty in one eternal graap.

He knows hi. ex.pression oom-

pletell, p.raolaely because he 1s his expression and. becauae he ha.s
t..~1a

w111ed

.:!!. ...t_....c ...to;;.

expreaaion into being.

Hor.oyer, the comp.NMll8ive Jalowledge

tbe Absolute mean.

Although the Absolute'a lmowledge

that there 1. ab801ute truth.

is j$pendent on the tree

or

obol~ea

or men, the truth ot their actlon

la gl'ounc1e4 in an Abaolute.

Truth 18 not II.Hly a 8uo.1eot1

tett which c an be aooepted

not, .a one wishe..

Ql'

Truth

lf1USt

torm to the Absolute who •••• all truth in an eternal now.
God knows each

IncUvldual person.

v.

mat-

oon-

10

While 1t 18 true that Ood

seea man In on. lnaipt, he alao a.e. the t..,ora1 aspeot 1n man.

He knowa that man 18 one who must 8t1"l.e 1n ttMe toward hia ideal
seU.

11

""'th, then, Gan b7 no _ana be 11m1ted to the region ot the
8~nae..

NAll t!"utb. le the obJeot ot acknowledgement, and not mere

17 ot immediate exper1enoe."
lcial data, the given.
lute'. wIll

Ite.l~.

12

~ruth

11 •• deep.!" than the super-

It has tor i t . ultimate source the Abao-

A. all things are only lnaorar as ther are ex
so too, they are true only insofar as

-

U 1b1d., p.

147.

12Ib1d ., p. 1$'9.
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b1 thelr purposes satiar" the Absolute's will.
The person 18 at first ignorant of his true identity and individuality" although th.at 1s of prime Import tor Mm.

ae cannot

Icomprenenaib17 •• e hi. role in the world, ths.t i8 to aa7, how h.
Iw!ll tuUll God's wlll.

!s.ng

But he at 1eaat has the asauranoe of lmo'

that (Jod knows who he re.117 18.

Secondly, the person knows

that hi. truth can be bad only 1n unitlng hl. finit. will with
OOd's.

The person must retain a certain amount ot diasatiatactlm

tor h. oannot ••e just how it ia that he 1. acquiring his individual!t1, hi. reality.

But, tb1rd17. the p.rson does oome to aome

appreclation of btmaelt.
The knowing, hoW...... that ltII will wins unique expression
in rq ur., and 11'1 '1111 11fe a. dlstinct fzaom aU other

1nd191dual l1ve., ls, IfsO faoto, ~ lndlvldual and consclou8 knowing. nenc. n
In the eternal world, and
in unit7. y.t 1n contrast with all oth.er Individual livea.
",. own lelt. whoae conac1ouanesa 18 118re &0 fl!cker1n6.~
attalna an Inslght into M7 own 1'8al1'1 and unlquenea8.~

Goa.

He .ee. himself a. that which with certain improvementa tits into
hi. world.

That pr-oprlet1 1s nis Nalit,._

-_.......

The Peud 01' Oak.f'1eld

oreek,14
Harold 1s a
,

In Royce's early novel
&'Ood

example of one who

flnda h1. troth by t'unct10ninc propol'17 in bi. collltluni t,...

The

truth of one.alr, however, can be tully known onlJ In the eternal

world, ". • _ In OOd, ,. become aware of."

flOW

our Willa are t"ul-

t1lled through unlon with h1a• • • • "1$

-

1)

Ibld •• p.

434.

14J081ah ROJee. The Peud. ot Oakf1eld Creek. A Novel of Calitornia L1te (Boston. Hoiighton, -m.tf1!n and Company" taB?):-lSH ce
he Wor d and the
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In lOur eternal Wl10n wl th God you s •• what even ;your
present 11r. and purposes mean; and they mean, even as
they are, Intlnl tel,. more than TOur hUft" type or oon-

sclousnes. makes man1te.t to yourself.
BOJroK

Good is that which oompli.s with the Acaolute's wl1l tor It.
Eve17 801t--i ••• , • .,.r7

t11s a purpo.e.
total structure.
I

b.mg--1. good

in the sen.e that it ful-

E.,ery ••It 1s more or 1 ••• apt and propGr in the

£.81'7 ••11" i8 good for t be whole and th.ere in

ttnd. its own good.

Man has a natural tenelenc," to s •• the pro-

pr1et7 or b.ing. and to will that propriety into existence.

"For

"

..

the ought, .s auch, 1s fle.er -,.el1 tore1gn to M1' own will. "17

The person know. that his oWn goodness 11e. within the Absolute.

He is good insotar

lute t &.
~n 0

&8

h8 1dentifie. hi. will to

Goodne... then, 18 gN>unded in the Absolute.

tl~

Abso-

Even tbough

an ••• 11 ttle of lasting worth 1n their eph.emeral role.,

ne.erthele.s ther have the assurance

tt~t

their .nlue a. persona

re.t. i..utable 1n the Absolute.
--that rtfI' _aning, I s&7. whAn inolude' in one whole
with all the.e endles& dlft8rences, 1. Identical with
Ood'. will. But taken bJ 1q•• 11", as now I am, I am,
Ind••d, l'el'llOte epough, in rq passing consclousness,

both trom MT own aelf-expression, and from mr tlnal
18
conscious unlon wlth mT Othel', namely with the Absolute.
16Ib1d ., p. 436 •.

-

-

l7Ibld., p.

-

35.

18Ib1d ., p. 37Q.

r

I
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1i"reedom

Royce strongly maintains that the person is free.
tree to become himselt.
dividuality.

}1an ls

Positively, freedom ls connected with in-

Precisely because a man is a lmlque individual he is

free.
Therefore are TOU in action Free and Individual, just
because the unitT 01' the divine lite, when taken together
with the uniqueness 01' this life, implies in every finite
being just such essential originality of meaning as that
ot which TOU are conscious. 19
The human sel1' must be tree to progress towards its goal or
ne facto, there 1s sin and a lack of harmony
human co_unitT. That can
attributed onq to an evil

to ignore its goal.
in the

be

tin1te will.

There would be a contradiction in saying that the

Absolute wills the har.aon, 01' all selves in the community and that
the same Absolute wills the .elve. not to be in harmony in the
community.

E!

Jure, it the human selt was determ1ned to its perfection,

there would be no morality.

The "ought," which the aelf is con-

acious 01', would have no significance.

Sin and virtue, the coward

and the hero, would have no distinction.
Freedom, however, ..... to mean for Royce much the same as i
did tor Kant.

Preedom i8 that condition in which a being is not

atteoted or intluenced by external factors in its activity.

l

Ac-

,cording to Royce, freedom is that possibility of the self by which
,

19Ib1d •• p. 470.

-
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it can find expression for its internal meaning.

No external

actor affeots the selt t • expression ot ita internal meaning.
The problem then ot rq freedom i . s1mpl1 th.e problem
It I am I and nobody else, and it I
. . I as an expression ot purpose, then I am in so tar fpee
just beoause, a8 an Inibvldual, I express b,. ~ exIstence
no w'.ll exoept Tff1 own.

ot mf 1ndlvlduallt.y.

oodne&. 1s oloaelr tied in w1th treedom.

Prect.ely beoause the

I

relt 1. tree. it can effeot good--the pr1!1'1a17 good etrect bei.ng

rt.

own realitr •. !,,'olat07 expressed it this.,.!

"It goodno8s has

aus.a, it 18 not f,oodne •• , it 1.t baa etrecta, a reward, it 1. not

oodness e1ther. So goodne •• 1. outalde the chain of cause end
trect. tt2l He mesne that no external oau•• b.J forcing Q will oan
rins about a goed .tt.ct.

The persOll must tr•• l,. of himself briqJ:

~bout good.

I

The human vill, then, 18 tr.. with reapect to specification

n the senae that no external t actor can Inhlbl t or corrupt the.
our•• ot .he manta Identtt7, hi. totem.1 meaning.

ow be •••n it the human will 1s

inte~na1lJ

But 1t must

tree, 1.e., whether 1t

• autonomoua or not.

In • moral act there 18 both an objectlve aspect and n Bubactlve one.

ObJectivel1, the pet-8011 1s 1n a wot-14.

s1n pl"opr1e't1 1. demanded ot him by the world itself.
8.

There a cer,{e must act

oerta1n way to 8.tla17 the "OUght" ihieh 18 presented to him.•

-

ZOIbld., pp. ))0-)1.
.,

~

kork:

:':

2~o Tol.tOT, Anna Xarenlna, trana • Constance Garn.tt (New
The Modern Llbrar"

19~dJ,

'P. 925.
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he "Ougilt" is presented in the form.:
world's Will.,,22

"Harmonize thJ will with

The moral agent is able to appraise the sit-

ation in which he must act.

If he could not, t hat he is a moral

gent would be meaningless.
And this indIvidual will of the agent must be so expressed
in the deeds that 1n some genuine respect it lies with the
agent himself to determine what nothing else 1n the world
determines, namel.J, the right or wrong character of this
deed, and its conformity or 2pn-conformit,y to the standard
which constitutes the Ought. J

is not the ltantian ttOugtlt" which Is a universal moral form.
"Ought," which is incarnated in the world, in each instance
s un1que11 significant for the person and tor t he world.
One place where internal freedom shows up is in an act of
For Ra,rce, sin is utter foolishness.
ng agalnst same external mandate.
ne' s "fel"1 selt.

It is not so much go-

It Is rather aoing against

'!he legislation as to what ls sin, then, is

d11 lett to s ome arbltr&.r7 wl11.

Sin is a denial of self under

he illusion ot selt-aggrandizement:

ftseeka to master the world

n the service ot the mere caprice ot the selt."24
Man intrinsicall., has treedom ot exercise.

Han can sin not

beoomins what he wishes regardless ot the Absolute's will.

Man

ana1n on17 bJ not beoom1ng what hi. ideal selt demands ot him.
"To sin is oonaoiouall

!2

ohooae !2. toret, througtl a narrowing ot

- .34S. - -

22ao1 ce, the World and the IndiVidual, II, .348.

-

2)Ibid., p •

24 Ibid .,

-

p•

.3S0.
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the field of attention, an
Man can! brink real! t7

whole truth..
be

OJ;'

OU~t

th.at one all"ead7 reCOgnizes_,,2 S

t or h1msel1".

lie can

0

hooae not to. ~e the

or

He etl11 isnore some ot I;h.e demands

not to be 18 the option tor man.

selt anoth..,r internal nea.n1ns-

h1e world.

1'0

But be cannot glt'e to him-

Be cannot rind his Identl tl. his

real! t1 accox-dilli to &n1 purpoae.

me one which

he baa. Which wae

ol'dalned b7 the Absolute. alma conta.1na 111s Identlt,.

Sin in its intention 1s not only opposed to the trutn of the
person, but it is alao tfworld-d•• troJing ... 26
YDl"1

struoture 01"

~allt7.

It undermines the

Conaelcuaq to act out 01" vlcioua ig-

norance i8 dlametrloall.:' oppoaed to that goo4ne•• wh.1oh give. the
world ita being.
VGl'sion

ot

Bowever, precisely because 1t 18 f1nite, the per

a bUlUlll will does not deatrOJ' the world, nor does It

e ••11 s.t the world ajar.

TPUe, the s1nner haa tailed to fulfil

hls role in the Absolute's expre.sion.
important us be 'l.fIIIi."I tb1nk.

But the 81nner is not 8e

God do". not need h1m.

He needs God.

Altb.oush 004 would 11ke him to tunction properlT... ·wh1ch is clear

from the It.ct t!mt he made the man wI tn bia own lnte:m.al l'4ean1nghe 1s flot at a 10a8 when the man goea aatrar.

B1 the etemal w1a-

dom ot the Absolute, the other me.vers of the world must and do
compenaate' tor th. loa. in expression :re.ulting trom the sin:

{"everl

... ..

!!!! de.~
.

~ 8.(.'l;J'AeW~.. rf'

!!:.!! 2 !.2!!. !!!!. ~

atoned tor.
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!!?l. !.2!!!.
.~)27

other .2!! .2 apnt, !! !l2l !!z .:!!!!. a§e,!~ .bJ~~l.t:, • • •
The ain brlngs about a whole 8et ot ~eaotlon~, wtdcA over-

oome its objectlve harm in the world-order.
not exlat In laolatlon.

"A. an ev1l, it can-

Its supplement appear. In the torm of

deeda ot atonement, repare;tlon, control, condemnation, and In the
end, tu1tllment.- 28
In splte of the tact that

&).1

_n :tI1UIIt atru.ggle with. vil,

muat fight to keep thnulelv•• open to reallt7, ea,.. Royce, the
world as • whole, vi••ed from the standpoint ot etern1t7 1. a
100<1.29

Ifbe .trl.1ng to tultil the "OUght" resulta In good.

That

man 1s able thua to acquiN his own Identl t7 and that ot the wox-ld
1s to hi. glor;r.
PbJalcal .vl1 results trom aome def1clenol •• in the flnlte
ox-de•., nob 10. the Absolute.

It thlnp SO wrong, 1 t 1s because

aome finite Will 1. malfunetlon1n&.

Royce 8.18 "that all 111 tor-

tune result. tttom the detect., or at leaat t)!'lom the detective ex-

pre.s1on,ot scae tlnite wl11.")0
tributed to Ood.

God 1. all-good. 8Ince .a Absolute Will he 1.

the .ouro. ot good.

All tinite belnga are good anlr insofar aa

tbe7 an e,xpre •• lonll ot God.

f.

will.

'far., m.eanJ.n& ot tbe wo1'4, .wat
27Ib14.,
p. 368.
•
•
28 Ib1d ., p. 371.

-

Thus, in no w~ can e.il be at-

29Ibld •• p. 379.
30Ib1d ., p. 390.

IJ.'!wa it 18 that e.l1, ':t1 the

be ••••re4 .tI-Om God.

"5?n18 ev11 1.

75
not 1n any aen•• in God, nor Tat 1n the world by anJ d1vine eansentI but 1s 1n a be1ng who, in b.1a fr•• dom, 18 now wholl,. Inde-

pendent of God or of any other moral agent."31

,be

world .a 1t now 18, that ta', a8 a not Tet completed f'ul-

f1lment ot the Abaolute'. wl11. 1. a good.
wbere the world wl11 tin4'lta gO~8 ••J2
and DOW aa partlal tulEllment.

There la no omega polni
Rather, it la good here

So too, the persOll, though not ,.et

full,- de.eloped. though not yet a complete expreaslon of hia in-

ter%W.l meaning. 1s a go04.

IlSo!'tall!l

Ar1:T aet ot a person bas

ot the eternal at

1t 18 an expresalon ot the at.ronal w111 of

leaat In thia aenael

the Absolute.

the character

The act haa pl.,ed a unique role whIch stands as an

tntesPal part ot the Abaolute'. 8xp~881nn tor all t1me. 33
An ethieal .elt' need be iatlortal.

R07C8 aqa tnat it would

be a contradtctlon to. &7 that an • thl!Ja 1 ••11' haa .tull,. aocompl1lb
ed It. puz-po.e.
POl" that 18 ot the ••ry ••••no. of Ethical Seltbood.
~17, to press on to new t.aka, to demand new oppOP~lt1 tor .erYI,., and to acoept a new roaponslbl1lt)" " th .".17 lnatant. 34

It tne .\hloal •• It

w.~

to

~

ou\ ot opportunitle., i ••• , ceaa.

to be able to tun.\lon .a an ethloal .elt, It could not ha"e been

-

)lIbld •• p. )99.

-

32Ibld., p. h21.
33 Ib1d •• p. 429.

~ru;

..

D.

11'0

~
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ethica.l in the :first place.

The ethicfll self' must place hilUelt

1n relation. to the whole order 01' good.

Slnoe he never full,.

schi ••• s hi. end, he 1. sustaine. in temporal exl.tence by that
.nd wblch 1. oOlUltltutlve ot hi. ethical nature.

Ethieal, i.e.,

baving a :ree-will, lmpli •• immortality.
In three cona14eratlona, R07ce ap.,.. .ob.ea the question 01'
h.UItaA tm.ortallt,..

ae

hope. to .how that IIBcrtallt,. 1. a logical

implioatlon in hi. dootrine ot

~lng.

Ue do•• not ctter

ti.. argument which v 111 be 006en1; to &n1' mind,

Q

onl1 tor

deductho.e

who )r,nov R07ce'a oonception ot bel.ng wtll hi. "le•• on bnortallty
be mean1ngtul.

Thull, while looJd.ng at hi. oonatderationa, the

baekgroun4 ot hi.

_t:aph.Ysle. mu.t be kept in aincJ..

The tirst approach that Ra,rce take. toward exposing human
baortall t1 l.fount!...d 111 God.

The human. elt 1. an. expression,

though partial, ot 004 !'d.mae 11' f in the mantler alread7 d •• cribed.
Aa suoh 1t ahare. in t11e bamortallty ot God.

To be immer8ed in

another ••It, a. vaa explained earlier, b7 no means 4•• tr078 one'B
own .elt.

It 18 quit. compatible, acoording to R07ca, tor the

h.uman • eU

'0 ha". ita own proper ext.tence in

the self

.".r,r

ot God.

What we 80 tar a ••• rt 1. that. in God,
individual
SeU, ho.... v.r lnalp1tloant Ita temporal endurance ftlaJ
seem. eternally pos •••• ea a £orm ot conaoiou.nes. that
i8 wnol17 other than this our preaant fliokerlng torm ot
mortal conaolou.nea.. And now, precisely auoh an a ••• rt1011 1s inde.d tOt. 'oeg1nn1ns ot Q philosophio.l conception
of' I:DaO~talit7.35
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Royoe would saT that such an immortallt1 retains personal
In tact, to exist ill God conec:'.ously the person has an

1dentlty.

•.waNines. of hi' true

sel~

and not just the pflrtlal view of sel.f

expertenced In t1me.

We ourselY •• , and not mere17 other lndIvldual., become,
In God. cansclous o~ what we are, beoAu8e, in God, we
become aWQre at how our w1111 are tulfilled through our
unton vttb ~, and ot bow hls Will wina 1ts lat1efaction
only" by v1rtue ot our unique share In the whole •.36
The •• cOlld approach ot HOrCH' views death .s

ot

tiL

more partioular se11' into a greater 8titlf.

the

mere passlng

Much a 8 our

p~s.

ins ide.s by d7ing take on significanoe in the integral p&raon,

our temporal 11Y.8 by teJtndnatlna take on signiticanoe in

the tn-

tesral ••It of etepnit7.
Fot- ua, to be _a na to tultil a purpose. 11" death. 1.
real at all, It js real onlJ In .0 tar .s It tultI1s
a pw.-poae. But
wbat purpose can be tulfilled 01
tbe ending o~ a llte Who•• purpose le eo tap unfulfllled,
I anever at once, the p\U'pct'. that can b. rultl118d 07
the ending ot suoh a 11t. 18 neee •• arlll' a purpoae that,
in the eternal 'World, ls Qoft8cioualy
and •• en fll
eggtlguoua vi th, I.!!.. !.!. l~l~.l"e !?I. -.!. 'iii7spii-l7

'.0",

1m2

whoe..

M?lt_n~

Yii

~poztal ~••~ e.emlt ~ cut shopE.

Death, then, la in no sense the annlb1latlon
~8tb.l',
~ha.e

o~

the

~p8on.

It la onG
more step, by which t be person enteros Into a new
\

ot

hi. existence.

pos.lbility ot death depends upon the tranacending
of de••h througb a 11t. that 1. richer and more consolous
than 18 the lit. which de.th out. ahort, and the rlcber
11f. 1n question 18, in .eaning, it not In temporal

~he

-

)6 I 'Dld.

31IbId •• p.

440.
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a.que.oe, oQBtinUOu8 wi th the verr 11fe that death
interrupts.'"
In the comprehen.1vevlew of the person, death takes on a

po.lttv. meaning which 18 hidden trom the vlew or temporallt,.
Man •••• now through a glaa. darkl,.

!he tJ'Uth ot a mathemat1cal

tuDot1on--e.g., t(x,7)--tranacenda it. meanlng at an7 particular
t~le

polnt--e.g., (xl' 71).

Ind.ed, the point baa Ita

teJtma 01' the tunctlon.

'.rhe point laolated trom the tntegration is

LRalgn1tloant.

identity 1n

The tlnalit7 ot death 18 not ao muoh that 1t bringa

to en .nd but rather than it ope lUI t'or greater f'ultilment ot' pur-

poee.
For our tbeor, implle. that when I dl., r.rq death 1s pos8ible
1.\8 It real t'aet onlJ in . 0 tar aa, in the eternal world, at
80_ time arte" death, an individual 11 vea who oonsc1ously
aay81 "It was rrq 11r. that there teAporal17 te.rm.nnted
\.IIU'ln1almd, 1 t. meaning not e.bod1ecl in 1 t. .axpfJ.rienoe.
But I now, Inrq hlp:r S.lt-expresslon, ••• wh7 and how
this was
&Dei in God I attaIn, utb.e1"'W1ae, JIll 1'ulr11ment
and 'fI7 peac •• ""9

h,

In hi. thlPd approach to h\UlaJl lJuaortall tJ', R07ce vlow. the
peraon .a an Int1D1t.

~trdo.l
~raon

ae~1.8

ot' moral acta.

The ethical

oan never s.7 enoUCh, tor that would b. to Ignore the de-

~and. 01'

Ntalit7. 1 •••• to .1n.

pn. at w.b1oh I oan nev ••

a.,..

HAn ethical taak 1 ••••entlal17

'K7 work 1a t'inlsbed. I .,40

Aa an ethical per.on. a man mu.at aot moral17 every time that

39Ib1d.,
-

38 Ib1d., p.

441.

p. 443.

40Ib1d., p.

444.
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ne

is confronted with a new situatlon.

aa

muat at least love thia

new world in which he tird 8 himself_But hia moral activlt)" Itael.
intluence. the world in such a wa.., that it 'becomes other them what
it wa. befoN hi. activIt..,_

Theref'ore, he is t aced with a new de-

mand, because ther. i . a new world tor hi. moral aotivit,..

'1'he

ethical person i. caught, happi17 enough tor him, acoording to
R07ce, in an infinite .er188 of Jaoral acta _

For him to come to a

term1nua would be a contradiotion fop hi8 ethical nature.
son t •

obll8~tion

to aot MCl"allJ In.ure. bi. Immortallt,..

»Tom the • tan4point ot tempOl'll11 tl, the ethioal

pit rson

lzaao.rtal in the .en•• tlult he must e ..er act anew ethical17.
muat

~

i""epre •• nt.d by an 1n.tlnit•••,.,....

is
li.

Ind••d, Royce point.

out, we never f;x.perience an individual wbe is full, expressed.

There i8 alwaY8 the po.sibi11 t7 tor more.
'rhat the IncU.vldual lIte ot allot ua Is not Bo_thing
11.1 ted in 1. ta temporal expl"8s.1on to t he lire that nO~J

we experience, tollows trom the vel'T tact that fi!re
. nothing tinal or 1ndlvidual 1s tound expre •• ea.}Prom the

8

Landpolnt

ot etem! t7, the ethical person 111 an

Int.ara1 one who stands 1n hi • .full 81gn1f'1cance eternally 1n God.

IRe

11i an infinite ~t1on, 'Whioh is comprehended u.nder one llotion

wldoh contains the character
~a.

or

the infinite. the ideal stllt.

explain$d earlier. there can be many partial

Int1nit~a.

As

tinite

eth1cal selves. and only one tot£\l Infinite. the Abaolute.
In or1e1". ttJ.en. Royce in tw/ee ways shows the; t

V1&tl' b

Wlion

80
Fit ttl Oed implies hia immortality:

(1) the fact that nw"u has his

ldentity in him, (2) that a part1cul&r

8el~

can

eme~t~

into a

larger selt without Its annihilation, (3) that no ethicAl selt can
rull7 accomplish ita purpoae. 42

As to wb&t the tuture lite may be. Rorce does not wish to
speculate.

l.osopby.

11e 1".el.
Man

IlNSt

th~t

it i8 outside of the boundaries ot phi-

h'Ulllb17 await the t\ltlWe in I

tOI'.

tor hi., wh.ere

t4e 1$ to flnd hi. true ldentlt,' and 1'lApplnea ••
I know not in the leaat _ I pretend not to guess,
What proces••• tnt. Indlv14ualit7 ot our ~n 11t. i .
t'uJ.-ther expressect. lo1het.ner through man,. tl'lbulatlons
here. or whathel' by a more direot road to indlvld\U.l.l fulfillment and peace. I know onll' that our vnrioWl meanlnp, throup What•••• Yiol ••1tud•• ot' f'oz-1Nr18, consciously
come to vhat 'We lnd1 vidual17, and OOd 1n whom alone we at'e
Individuals, shall toaether resaN lUI the atta1runfm.t of
our unlque place, J\Ild ot' our true z-elat1onshipa both to
other indlyiduals anC to to. all lnclusive Individual.
God. MueU. F\U'tbel' !rito the ocoult 1 t 1. not t he buaine.s of phllo.opbJ' to go. HJ neareat friend. are already, as we have seen, ocouJ.t enough t'or
l walt
until their ItOnal ahall put 0Il--Ind1v1dua11ty.43

a.

b7

r..

Hr. Cotton, I thJ.nk. haa not ole&r17 enoup 41at1naU1ahed

Viewpoints ot t!me trom that ot at.mltT 1n nOloe'a phl1osopa,.

~he

fl7

coatualng the two outlooks. he has laid Royoe open to his chitrgel

~ha'

tbe human pepson doe. not retain personal taBortalltr and that

~oJ'.el.

intereno •• tor 1""8.11'7

5.1"8

lnvalld.44

42ROl'ce, !!:! W'crlq !.2!!.a! p!dlv1dua.l, Il. 445.

43 110108 , ~ conceRtlo.!!. 2! Immortalltz,

Un1.....

44Jlullliua Ha"7 cotton, R&iti'
Bcu.-varc1

~aa ••ohua.tt.,

on

p. 60.

tht Human Self (CRmbridge,

,-rr.ii; !'JS1i' ,pp: 1$4-55.

-
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Royce's statement,s will retain thelx- vplidity if one realizes that in the temporal order the selt he.s . nClt acoomplished its
goal. its ideal selt, and alao thlt in the

ete~al

ox-del" the selt

1s tully expressed a8 par-t ot t he Absolute's total expression ..
~ternity

tranecenda tImeJ but it d08S not negate it.

worked out temporally cannot

be

be

What 1s to

superseded by its actual1ty in

~tel'nit7.

!'lb.. temporal, viewed tl'Om eternity. ia sublated, but not de-

atrOTed or eliminated.
II

!rne eternal, viewed trom time, is real as

signlticant component in 1'in1 t@ functioning.

infinite, the ideal will always be approached but never attain-

~he

~d

That tl» eternal,

in tlme does not d18s01ve the eternal into nothingness.

~ternal

The

i8 constitutive ot the tinite; and, 80, it 18 just as real.

ro do justice to Royce-s

ph11oao~,

we must maintain both point.

ot view.
The human pel'son i. one, an individual.
by reason of" his

hi.

~b.~lut..

ng

PUl"POS8,

which t lows trom the good will ot the

The Absolute. in willing the person into being by g!v-

a purpose. has given the person his own proper identity,

11s ultimate rea11t1, his truth.
~elt,

He is an individual

The person, by being true to b1m-

makes himselt t.te Wlique Indl vidual that God wants h1m to be.
Man'a freedom, identlt7, and immortal1ty are entWined, for

1s t"l-e. to acknowledge the 1ndi" iduali t1 of ethers.

~
~o

He 1s tree

enter the world of appreciation where 10"8 b1nds individuals to-

~ard

their mutual perteotion

a8

the expression ot the Absolute.
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Man is .free to aoquire his own tru.e 1denti ty by living in oon.formit)" to the "OUght."

Man is

:.ere.

to make himself an individual 'b7

uniquely joining the unitr of the world.

his degree of immortality.

He is tree to determine

CHAPTER V

A CRITIQUE ON ROYaE'S HOTIO. OF THE KUMA. SELF AS
PRESENTED II' ........
THE WORLD
AlID -......THE DIDIVIDUAL, VOL. II
d.----.

This 1. the la.t phase
otlon

o~

the hWJlll.n • elf.

o~

thi. endeavor to pre.ent R07ce'.

A ori t ique of H07ce' s doc trine of the

uman • elr will be given here.

It i. hope' that the essentials ot

s doctrine have alrea47 been presented In the previous chapters.
owever inadequatel,..

ThrougBout this work, a primary concern has

.en to bring out the metaphysioal basis and significance ot Rqrce.
It is hoped that bJ now it is somewhat clear that Boyce'
.elr," "co_unit,., tf

•

purpose ,ff "Absolute," etc. are not

arbl

nwl'e

ra'1!7 concepts, but that the7 are ..ant to indicate the true strue
In thls chapter, some of the most often used
abels for R07ce's philosoPQr will be conalaered briefl,..

Then,

look at the pro's and con's ot his s7ste., as pertalning to the
person, will be taken.

Finall,., a word will be mentioned

the significance of Ra,rce for the world.
One ot the dangerous pitfalls tor historians ot philosoptv'
s to categorise a philosopher with a readT-made label.

The

rea~

that tne desoription ot a philosopher demanda tailred wording, tor it he i. a philosopher of any con.equence his

8)
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thought i8 a unique contribut10n to the progress of ideas.
name. are often given to Royce'a ph1loaopbJ:
voluntarism, Begelianiam.

Four

idealism, pantheism,

.ov a considerat1on of those ready-made

labela and an attempt to point out their inadequacies vill be presented.
IDEALISM

Idealia. appear. in two distinct, though parallel, avenues oj
ph1loaophJ.

It can appear 1n epistemologf or in metaphyaics.

-.....--

Royce, In The World and the Individual. and previous works,
haa done little tovard working out a detailed epistemology, although in later works he did aetthe general framework ror his
~pistemoloS1.
~

Pieroe aa.lsted Royce in developing his

epi8temol~

provIding him with the Idea ot interpretation in ita triadio

.tructure.
temolog.

But, even that could hardly be-called a detailed eplaPerhaps, the

la~k

ot a well thought out theory or cogni-

tion 1s the greatest det1eiency in Royce'. ph11osophJ.
It Royce is denominated an idea11st, the term muat be taken
in the metapn,sical senae.
~1ew
~iew,

Idealism, taken metaphySically, is the

that all reality 1s of the same attlft aa .pirit.

In such a

matter lo.e. its prima:rr role .s a basic prinCiple and is

reduced to a certain kind ot spiritual dete:rm!nat1on.
~tapbJsical

Royce's

idealism, it should be pointed out, is in the frame-

irFork ot the Absolute--t1ni te polari t7, which 11 as considered 1n
~hapter

I.

If one were to ask RO)"ce whether he were an idealist or not,

o.e would unabashedl,. answer that he was.
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But what doe. idealism

If it •• ans juat a denial ot matter, then surely Royce would

_an?

tit under thia heading.

But it by idealism one meana the denial

of all objective reality, i.e., all reality other than the subject,
ROTce would hot be an ideallst.

ot other tinite .elve. and

~lso

Certainl,. Royce admits the r8a1itJ
the Abaolute.

Perhaps, then, one

could call hi. an objective 1deallst.
one mli:y -fu.l"ther ask:

is there arq signlficant difference be-

tveen an obJeotlve ideali.t and a realist'

of other beings.

Eaoh adDdts the truth

Indeed, it aeell18 that the role the realist gives

to matter 1s actually satisti&d in the idealist's phil080phT by
some sort ot functionary form.

Also, the rea11st himself will ad-

mit that he cannot 8trict17 de tine matter, because a.n'1 definite determination does not pertain to matter qua matter, that is to s ay,
1t cannot reveal the :full meaning of' prime Dlat'Cer.

Voltail'e, in a

of mockery, threw that very thins in the tace of

~oment

philosophlr~.

ifhe pb1losophera all spoke at the same time a8 before, but the,.
ilere allot difterent opinions .,,1

Again, he write.:

"'lheD rYou

:ion t t know what l1wtter is."2
Jfevertheless, upon investigation, it must be a ald that there
1. a
op.tq'.

~ery

deep significance which severa the two schools ot philo.-

The realist hold. tilat matter is e tru., intrinsic prinCiple

ot a material being, that it i . the potency which canleCeiY8 torms
lvoltaire, "Ki.rome§&8,- ed. Walla.e Powll. (Prench Storie.,
Bantam, 1960), p. 38.

~ew York,

2

Ibid., p.

40.
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and which limits the being by restricting the kind of ita form and
so, too, the being's act ot exiatence.

Ot course, that presentntta.

1s backwards in that the being is !:'irst had, then its

principlE~8

are found through analYkis.

wo~ld

Some realists (Thomists)

say

that the principle ot indivIduation for a material being is ultlIna tell"

matter.
The realism which ROTce more directly opposes 1s empIrical

realism rather than tho.ism.

Royce react. against the pOSition

that the I'esl is the empirical and that aa.l other knowledf,e is In
the order ot mental constructs.

trom mind.

The real 18 mind under the appearance of purpose.

The idealistie denies any

ing.

ind.terF~nate

principle for. be-

He must, theretO!" e, look elsewhere tor hi. principle of In-

~lv1duatlon.

~s Beenas
~8

The real for Royce 1s not divorcee

IUs prinCiple wlll be tormal} and, so, the 1ndi vidual

such because of' hiB place in .. system.

How tll.e individuAl

to tlmetion in a tormal system. i . preeiae17 what lnS.kes him an·

~ndlvidual.
lsauw~s

ita

ROTce's prinoiple of Individ.uation i . pu.rpose, which
ch~act.r

in terms ot the whole system ot the Absolute.

When the idealist vlew. the individual .a functioning In a
~articular

place and a t a particular ti_, be haa

Il0t

bridged the

~ap

between himself and tr. reali.t who sa78 that tbe material be-

~ng

Is oomposed ot primary matter and substantial torm.

M

However,

has b:rought the two schools ot thought a bIt oloser together.

rhat, at least, Royoe has done.
rorward

WGrlts

His IdealIsm apeaks in straight-

Vlthout QD7 mystical ob.curi t7-

He tried to explain
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the world as he tound it.

He tried to pierce the surface of ex-

perienoe to elements more fundamental to the human
1098, loyalty, selt, God.

11 a'1

of lite:

!Hs honest attempt at disclosing the

truth of res.lity can hardl,. be ignored, even by those In the real-

ist's osmp.
Al though RO'1ce pr1me.rI1r direct..ed hi. oharges against the
realism ot Positivisllt
Schol~8tici.m.

~.nd

CrItical Reallsm, he also had in w.nd

Becau•• of that,

~cr

on. reason, his criticism mar

be thought 1n terms ot Soholsstic Realism.

Also, Royce's 1dealis.

is more vividly delineated against the baokground ot Scholastic
RealIsm.
PAJi1'HEISM

otten the oharge 1s laid aga1nat ROTO. that he 115 a panth.eist
It would be good now to go into a briet coneideration of this seoond label, Vb.lob.. it will be eventually ooncluded. is misleading.
~

vay of detIn1t1on, pantheism 1s the beli.t that the universe

Itaken as a v_Ie is God.

Adm1ttecllT. Royce does leave hiueli'

to the charge ot pantheis..

ope~

It ba. be.n •••n that the d1atinotlon

betveen tinite beings and God in Hoyoe's

pb11~soph7

i8 a b1gblJ

retined notion and i. not e ..117 grasped on tirst aoqua1ntance.
Sinoe Royoe oall. une

unive~.e

the expreaaIon ot God or of the Ab-

solute. God, tor him, takes on IdentIt, in the
ation. of the tinite being..
~s

tinlte expressiona.

~eing

particula~

determin-

In that .en.e. God 1& identlfied wItt

However, tor Royce the Individual finite

retains ita own personal realit7 while at the same time it
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the meaning

or

that reality only 1n terms ot the Absolute,

Royce thinks that the torm ot the expression 1s determined
the tree choice ot God, which 1s made in eternity, i.e., tranendentally to the temporality ot the expression itself.

God's

11 transcends the tinite world; and, so, God 1a not determined b
tin! t e being.

'l'hus, It seems that Royce draws an extremely tine

istinction between the Absolute and its expression.

only 1n

8ns.--as was pointed out in a prevIous ehapter--c9n the expre8s!cn
e said to be identifie. with the Absolute.
It seem. that to label Royce a pantheist is misleading alhough in some sense it may stand.

Also, auch terms as monist and

anp.lchist should be applied only with reservations.
once again let it be pointed out that there are two viewoints which must be taken to bave a tull appreciation ot Royce's
hilosophy.

The viewpoints ot the finite selt and ot the Absolute

erve as a dialectic in Roycels philosophr in auch a way that each
omplements the blas ot the other.

Certainly, fro. the viewpoint

t the tinite 8elt. Royce's philo8oph)r ls not a pantheism.
18 all t7

The

ot the pepson nevep dls.01y •• , top R07CII, 1nto that ot the
The hl.1l'i18n person, becauae he consciously directs himselt

his own personal and, by nature retains his personal idenHi8 internal .eaning, although it servII. the purpose of the
bsolute, is the mants own identity as un indiVidual.
On the other band, however, trom the Viewpoint of the
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Absolute. the meaningtulness of the .elt la that lt ls an expresslon of the Absolute.

The ldentl tJ' of the fln! te aelt has slg-

nltlcant reality on17 in the Identlt7 of the Abaolute.

It would

be too almple to. a7 that the finite belng i8 the Absolute.
be said that le tunctlona aa part ot the Absolute.
R070e does verge on panthelsm.
two.

It ma

In that sense,

Again, that ls but one aspect ot

When Roree' s ph1loaoph7 ls seen trom both vlewpoints, the

term panthelsm dOH not a.em to give a true lndloatlon ot his philosopbJ'.
8070e has pres.nte. his conception ot the relatlon ot God
ani :fln1te a.lves ln hla explanatlon ot the structure ot the Absoute.

fhere he pointe. out that God, whose torm ls expressed 'bJ'
of reall ty, ls a real Self and men, 'bJ' reason of thelr

onaoloua strlvlng to fUlfll thelr unlque purposes, are real .elvea
lthl.n the Selt.

Henoe, to present 80708 with a questlon on creation

ould be the s . . aa asklng Borce to leave the context of his own
h11oaopbJ ln order to thlnk with conoepts of another philosophic
onten.

R07C8 doe. not speak of the creatlon of the •• It bJ the

bsolute ln oause-ettect terma, tor he conoelves ot oausatlon muoh
s Kant did betore him.
ontext ot causatlon.

Creatlon ls a conoept whioh arlses in the
Por R070e, the origin ot finlte be1ng 18 no

oncelved ot 1n terma ot ereation, except b7 analogy.

As an ldea

a crea ted b7 the mind ot an to express the man t s meanlng, ln much
he same manner man 1s oreated

b7

the Absolute to express Hls mean-
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It 1s important to note here, in passing, tlif!t,t there
arent levels in thirUdng.

At times, it can

l~ppen

tbet two atate-

in their derivative form are quite ditrerent, although 1n
prime meaning the, are actually the sa.e.

Paul Till1cn polo

ut that, when the oause category 1s superseded uy a more tundantal conception of creatlon, that which is at the prime
e understood only symbolically at the derivative level.
And it" this is done and is understood, the diff'erence between substance and causallty disappears, for it God is
the cause ot the entire series ot cause. and effects, he
is the SUbstance underlJlng the whole process ot becoming.
But this "underlying" doe8 not have the character of' a
substance Which underlies its accidents and which Is oompletely expressed by them. It i8 an under17ing in which
Bubstance and accidents preserve their f'reedom. In other
word., it i8 substanoe not as a category but as a symbol.
ADd, it taken aymbollcallJ, there 1. no 4itterenoe between
priia oausa and ultima substantia. Both mean, what can be
ca e. In a more dIreotXi .,a60XIc tera, "the creative and
abysmal ground ot being.
In thls term both naturalistio
pantheiam, based on the category ot substance, and rationalistic t~eism, based on the oategorr of cauaallt7, are
overoome.
Perhaps, then, 1n view ot Tll1ioh'a statement, panthelsm
hould be applled onlJ 87Mbol1ca1l7 to R07ce's ph1loaopn,.

Tll-

lch t s vlew la mentioned 1n order to point out the possibll1t7 of
more bas1c level than the pantheism/theism dlchotomf so as to
ard of't a haat7 use ot labela, which are otten 80 general, and,
vague that they beco.. insignlticant and deceptive out ot
ontext.

The author ot this paper, however, prescinds from the

3 paul Tlllich, s,atematlc Tn-oloST, (Chlcago:
hicago Press, 19S1), , 238.

Unlverslt,r ot
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question ot whether !rilltoh is right or not. ror hls aim is to
stir on8 to ret'leetic,n oberer. an applioation or pantheism is made
to Royce's syataR.
VOLUN'l'ARISH
Voluntari8m i8 the theo1'7 that will ia the doa1nant :factor
1n experience or in the const1tution of the world.

Secause Royce

did la7 great stres. on the role or w111 as the ultimate source ot
reality. his pbilosoPQr may be said to be a kind ot voluntarism.
However, one ought to specify the place will bas 1n Royce's syste.
Will is the ultimate principle of reality for each individual, including the Absolute himself. precisely because each individual is
iD_ing because

or

an. a ot of will.

In the case

ot a fin! te being,

the Absolute. by willing the actuality of a particular expression,
bring8 into being that individual whose identit7 is found 1n hi.
purpose tor being. i •••• to achieve the ideal aelt willed to him
as his own by the Absolute.

In the case ot the Absolute, he wills

hi. own existenoe necessari17.

Since he is hia Ideal self as he

eternally exista, the Absolute wills to maintain, not to create
anew, his perfeotion.
~erT

Certaln17 his willing ot hi. .elt is ot his

nature. but it is also identical with him.

~OTeets

Aocording to

conception of being, a thing exists if It has a purpo.e.

lhe purpose ot the Absolute is to be himself; that Is his being.
rhe purpose ot the Absolute's wIll is to maintain the
existence or that the Absolute maT be himselt.

Absol~te's

Since, then, the
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purposes of the Absolute ",nd 01' hIs will are identical_ the Abso-

lute 1. identloal with his will.
W1ll, howevEu;-, vaa nevel' lert to b11nd haphaaardness il"!

ROTC.'. ph1lo8opbr. Will was always guide. '07 the intention of
the

Absolute.

In. Abeolute In eternl't7 wIlled hi. own expression

acoording to hi. Intention.
sreatel" p8.J'ltlcipatlona

or

Pintte

.elv•• wIlled th. . . . lv.. into

"alltT '01' apprecIating the A.bsolute fS

purpose •• it became apparent 1n tne world..
ultimate principle

or

rful11'7 tor ftc7ce.

tion 01' the will in the Cftse

No doubt, wl11 is the

Since, the, the opera-

ot the Ab.clute and

or

fInite beings

Is guided br an intelligent vlt)w towarc! eo_ end, vo11 t1011 suppose.

intellection.

In af'f1rJ1ing the pnorIt7 ot vill In his philo8oplq'

Rcye. neither negatee nor diaparae;ea intellect, whoe. opEtratlon

though di.tinct !'rom 'Will's harm.on13e8 with 'to{ll1 in appreclatlon.
Ho,."e would s81 wlth 1!homaa
punctlorl than

GOW

A KempIa:

its def'ln1t1cn.,,4

HI would rath.~ feel eom-

Yet, as hI. lIte of phlloa-

oPtv' bears witne8S_ he 'Would alao t17 Intellectualq to appreelR.te
compun.otion.
The ultimate Will ia
Abaolutf1.

Identic~l

woo conaeioUBlJ dIrects

with a subsistent person, the

the fora of fInite being.

jihen

411 the nuanoes teund In the whole context bave been nl5tde somewhat
explioit, w111 _1' be said to be the ultimate principle for H01ee.
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HEGELIANISM

ROTce, 1 t can be s aid without doubt, waa greatl,. Int"lueneed
by the Hegelian I,.atem, which he studied, as well as those ot Kant

and Piehte.

However, it 1t Is otten misleading to label a philos-

opher with a 'Jpe

title, it is even more misleading to label one

philosopher with the name ot another.
ma,. be called

dicated.

'1::!

Yet, In so.. sense, Royce

Hes.:-lian, provided that that senae is clearly in-

It 1s preterable, however, not to label ROTce an

r,rhe major influence in R07ce's thought certain17 was not
Peirce and James are much more sign1tlonnt.

~nd

H.~el.

Indeed, Royce's ear17

religious environment probablr contrIbuted BOre to his
than did Hegel.

Hege~n

phllosop~V

The ditterences tound In the two s7atems ROTce

Hegel into d1tterent c&Cps.
Now 1t would be good to lo<>k at some of the points ot dit-

Iteroence In the two nen's ph110sophies and then some points

or

s1mi·

larlt~.

Hegel places the ultimate principle ot re&11t7 in the unl·

~ersal.

He calls this universal "Spirit."

~er8al,

It 1s a concrete unl-

that 1s to 8a7, SpirIt though un1versal exists onlT in in-

~iv1duals.

SpirIt gives to the indivIdual reality_

That tRct be-

conscious to SpIrit itselt (tor man is an instanoe ot Spirit)

~omeB

~ t~

process ot unlveraallzat10n bf which the individual 1s ne-

~at.d~

or rather .ublated.

~hat

ROTC., on the other hand, ma1ntains

the ult1Jaate pnneiple in realitJ is the Individual.

real means to be &n indIvidual, to have a unique purpose.

To be
Indeed,

iror Be70., he i& moa t real who is moat indivIdual, albeit that the
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determdnations ot individuality take their
oontext at the Indt vidual.
i . U1 Indl vidual.

sl~pe

from the communal

The Abaolute, who is :118 own context,

lie finda hI. realization, cfJJ"talnlJ not in the

negation ot finite lncUviduals, but in their pertaetion.
the lnd1"lthUll 1.

It

goo4.

RGT~

POI" Hegel, the indlvldual person is a

perYeraion of tne unIyersal.>
~,ua

.For

Although, admittedl"

1n e8sentlal-

good fI.nd bad are J;3ftan1ngful (lnly as polar opposites, it stande

!clear

trOll

the contexts that ROTC. aooeptl5 the inai vidual and Hegel.

rejects the mcUv1dua1 •.

With that baato orientation toward the individual, noyce
wanted hie syatem to embrace the Whole ot rea1l t7 ftot by exclusion.
but by inolo10n.

H. wanted to avoid any Nlductlonlsm." which, he

felt, would narrow hia Yiev.

1'acets 01' 11 yingJ

ae

want•• to exclude nODe of the

10Ye". cienee, emot i

tl'Utha, ains. errors.

tifarious dlacour8.a

0" , abatraetlorus, virtues,

Ue felt ttlAt aegel wrongq !'eduoed the mul-

or

~ealit1

to one:

His L!egel til great philosophical and systematio er>l"or

la" not 1n 1ntroduolng logic into pas. lon, but in CODeelving the logio ot pas.lon as the only logic: ao that
lOU in vain endeayor to get satiafaction trom Uegel's
treatMent of" oute,. nature, or 8c1enc8, ot mathematics,
or of arq ooldlJ theoretical topic. About all theae
things be 18 1:waen8ely augge8tlve, but never ~lnal.
w.. aY8t_, ... 8;yate., baa orumbled, but bia vital comproehenalon ot nUl" l1.t"e l"emaina ttorev81'.6
Notwithstanding what haa been a ald, it J'GU8t be admitted that

·5He.&1, Pheno_noloQ, p. 504.
6JoSiah Hoyoe, The 8111'1t o:f Modern Pbilosop& (Boaton:
r!ougbton, Mltrlln andTo'., t8l}2};-pp. 226-i?'!.

Hegel's phllonophy did il'1£luence no)"c.te thought.
tain eetln1te similarities 1n doctrInes.

'rhel'. are cer-

Both m8n were Id.alistu

(in a sense alrtHtdy apfielfle4) with the :relIgious baokground ot'

pl'oteatanthllrl (although of dltfel'ent denom1natlcna) and the philosophical baokground

or

Kent, Picht., and Schelling..

was in contact with Hegel.

Hesel,1 Royce

hR8

Oertalnl1 RoyM

In hi. many e.8.,8 and lectures on

given good 1nd1e~tlon that he

WQ8

well acquainte.

with Hegel, eyen to the knowledge ot the man'~ p~rsonallt1.6

thoroU8bl1 could hardlY help but be influ-

·who haa read Regel 80

enced

One

bf his thought. If in no other form, be would at least find

hllWSelt reacting to Hegel.

pla1ed a detinite

1'010

So, it can be aatel,. aaid that Hegel

in the mnturinr, ot Royce as

Q.

philosopher.

The doctrine which moat Hadl17 comes to Jl1rld ita the gl'tultea1
point ot s1m1l.arlt)" between the two Vl8n 18 that

a-r

ot the Absolute.

the notion 01" the Absolute, both men hoped to 00_ to a compre-

hensive view and explanatIon 01" roa111:7.

That doctrine is the

co~

idea. tor both men, from whicb sprins all subsequent l"amificationa.

!Because ot that, it mu.J' be saId that both veMa mon1ats 1n the sena.
tha'

tn.,

80ugnt to explain the whole of

prlnotple.
ter-Jd.nancy

'l'bay each
tOl ..1gn

to

d.n1~d

re~llt.1

1n terms of one

r.va.tter--th.at is, a p!"inalplo of 1nde- .

8pI~lt.

~Dld.

JosIah Royce, Lecture. on Mortem Ids",U •• (Ne", fln"len:
UnlYeratty Pre •• , 1919'. · I

8 R070. ,

!!! 8211"1~ .2! Mftdem

I

Phl1ol0P!5t. P. 196

!!

.eg..

Yale
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Although their ultimate prinoiples vere substantially ditterent, tor one absolute universality, tor the other absolute inc.i1vidualltJ, their philosophies took on a similar struoture.

tor them was to be found on17

in the vhole.

'1'ruti:

The :tact isolated tX"CII

the whole expression dlaaolv.s into Insigniticance and, so, unreal·
it7.

The whole :tor Hegel vas an absolute, unipolar intelligibili1J,

Spirit.

aeallt,., tor

hi.,

could have only one torm.

A.ll of real-

ity's meaning vaa to be derive4 from one unIversal idea, Spirit.
the whole tor R07ce, on the other hand, waa an arbitrar;y absolute,
determined by the tree choice ot the individual Absolute.

Since

the real is determined b.r the individual, reality could have been
molded in all the infinite ways that the infinite number 01' possibles allowed.

Prom the infinlte possibles, one retalit;r was cbos••

• either :Segel nor Royce allovs for a trall8cencient.

God, tor

aegel, ls mere17 the universal realit;r 01' individuals (thls author
interprets :Segelts "Spirit" as his God).
only in its concretion in individuals.

God is intel11gibility
In somewhat the same wa7,

R070e'. God expHss.S his own being in teJ>MS 01' finite beings. Wit!
his immanent determinations in the world, he also functions as a
whole; that identities hi. a.a an lndi vidual God.
The relation between R07ce and Begel vill not be pursued fur·
ther, although more thoughts along those lines would be truitful
tor an understanding 01' each man's philcsopbT.

The influences ot

:Segel on R07ce and the ditterence 01' the tvo vould require the
treatment ot a book.
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How that this first

pa~t conce~ning

the common labels for

Royce's philosopbJ has been concluded_ the second part which deals
with his favorable points_ will be taken.

Some aspects ot Royce's philosopbJ impressed this author as
~eing

both original and signifioant.

stress on the individual.
~nll

Indiyidualit, is

t~e

b1 being an individual can a being be real.

at odds with Segel on this point.
~ith1n

torm of

~.at

~ealitl.

ROlce is so_what

Hevertheless_ Royce

incorpo~atee

his notion ot individualitl the idea ot universalit,.

individual_ because he is constituted
~iv.rsal
~nd

Pirst_ ROJce places

oharacter.

.igniticance.

Only in bis

The

bJ his communitl_ contains a

wo~ld

can man have anJ realitl

As Uei4egger would say, Da.ein finds its.lf

thrown into being, structured in a world, and presented with pos9
.ibili ties in terms of that world.
Whether one i8 willing to agm J
~ th

ROlce that the world is its.lf t he expres.ion of Self, at

~east

it must be said that Royce baa brought to light that man is

ontologicall, _ ocial.
~bat

Whereas other philosophers have mentioned

man i_ bl nature sooial, tew have gone as tar as R010e in

irorm.ing their philosophy ot being around tha t point.

Acco~ding

to

ROJce, the meaning of maa's being evaporates when it i. presented
abst»actlJ, tor abstractions tor.. mental constructs, tbe tools of
9.a~tin seidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Maoqua~ri. and
Harper and Row, 1962).

Ii:. Robina on (Hew York:
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be sciences.

Man 11ve. embodied in a world.

tiny true repreaenta

ot man must be delineated 1n bi. social a tructure.
The human .elt 1n ROToe'. pbiloaoPQr 1. always a unlque inIvldual.

Roell man 1n bia uniqueness takes on the Import ot real-

t,ta total expression, tor no otber •• It can take his ea.ential

art in reallt7.

True. the. elt tlnds Ita meaning 111 1ts role,

18 not Nduced to a functionary.

Man ri ••• above h.1s job

world expres.lon preci ••ly beeau.e he i8 a .elt, a oonsclo

Ing who appreCiates h1Ju ,plt and others tor What they are.
elou. person cannot be translate. b7 ·cog."

Man In b1...1t baa a

Ign1t7 which detl.s all meohan1stlc 1nterpretations of' him,
un~overs

hi. dign1 t7 1n his tunotionlng.

KUlt'reel1 choo

Insofar as he aoquiNs hls ladl vidual Idantl t7, he has glw.

o

~elt

a dlgnlt1 not to De swallowad b, hi. external relation••

The human person i. give. the po •• lbll1t7 and direotion tor
s growth 1n being wben tho Absolute thruats hi. Into existence
1 th an ideal salf' to. hi. 60al.

However, the human persCD

DNS'

" tb.e strongth ot bis own tree will aohlovo and pl'O&1"e.8 tow8J'd

ae

oan brlng about hi. own betterment by aotlng In ac-

ord wi th hi. purpose 1n 111"e.

To a ot morally and t.c> brins about

is personal growth, then, he must appreciate hi. own lnternal
aning and those of otheraa.

Se!4egger quotes Pa1!'m8n!d.s:

"To gar

auto no'ein eat1n te

'"ina! (for thlnkinS and belng are the sa.)."lO

-

la Ible •• p. 215.

kd

Royce say. muoh
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same.

To be onesalr one must know the truth of onels own be-

and that at others.

With such awareness man s a act. as to

ring into reality rds further development as that person wh1ch
1ntends b1m to be.
The buman 8e11' i. lovee! by God.

I'ot only, does God love a

n because he fulfills a certain purp08e 1n His total expression,
becauae God bas a true concern that this man does develop
God

]mo.!. tully man t s internal mean1ng.

He

ssta up

Ii

or1d in. which this meaning is signifioant. a world where the man
an flouriah in his full identity_

n's

freedom.

He in no way takes away the

Such a God trull' loves man.

n • xpre.aion or God.

And further. man is

As God loves himself, 10 too doe. Be love

Aa an object ot the dlvine love, man takes on another
imen810n 1n import.
Royce .ets forth hi. definition ot sin in the framework Inlcated above.

Sin i8 a deliberate turning tram the truth of one-

elt and of other8 and aoting In that ignorance.

Baaioally, then,

1n 1a a denial ot being to oneaelf and othera and, so, to the
blolut.,Goa Himselto

Being is that which fulfills purpose.

enle. purpo.e or internal meaning.

Sin

S1n, therefore, denies being.

!he ugliness at aln, then, is to be tound 1n lts.lf and not

o much In some transgresaion .. gainst an external law.

Man bY' sin

lna d.stro7s hi_elf and narrows hi8 contaot With the world, the
orr.lativ. tactor to his real
and annihIlation.

signl~lcance.

In a1n man finds hi.

In God man finds his happ1nes. and
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Another point to Royce's credit is that in his philoBopbJ
love plays a leading role.

Lo,. is the adhesive of the oommun1ty.

Man ia bound to the world of selves insof"ar

ES

he appreciates in-

ternal meanin,;s and comports himself in acoord with that reali ty
of others.

In such a world of appreciation, man finds himself.

As he wishes to himself his own good, so must he Wish to tre world
its good.

As he loves himself, so must he love

tm

world.

In vain, then, does ll'l8.n seek full cognition through abstrac-

tion.

An essential ingredient to true knowledge, i.e., "apprecia-

tion," 1s love.
one.

Love means to ",ish goodness or existence to some-

Only when a person enters into such a relatlonwlth another

or even himself', can it be

8

aid that he truly appreciates that per-

son as a self", one who has an 1nternal meaning, a divine destIny
to fulfil.
Science, in R07ce t s aystem, takes a bs.ck seat to
Which is accessible to ord1na1'7 men.

at

knowledge

Royce would ell1phatlcall'7 de-

nT that the scient1sts, and even the protess! onal philosophers, art
the on17 persons who live a truly human life and that tne rest ot

:men are second-class citizens in the world.

Every man can and

should love himself" and his neighbor.
Royce's ph1losopbJ contains maD7 answers to the problems of
his daT, as well as the present.
aocial awareneas.
private enterprise.

There was then in. America little

It was the age of indiyidualism and unre.trietec
SCience, boastful in its frf,sh starts and

early successea, .sume4 a dictatorship oyer men's minds, whioh
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any in their ignoranoe humb17 aooepted.

l

,I

The very rich wanted to

tar that way, b,. keeping the very poor very poor.

The strong w...

rowdlng out tte weak freD. &nJ' rightful plac. 1n the 'World.

In

he faee of aueh a world, Royce thrust forth hia ph110.opbJ which

I).ve to each man an identit7 wbich could be found on17 in hi. aotal structure.

Most lett Royc. to b.1. academic 011"01•• and oon-

1nued in thelr m.undane affair. as th.,. had a1w8.7. done.

A few

aw that Royce's philosopbJ does contaln a true .ign1f1cance tor
he

world.

The United Ratlons, the growing appreoiation ot the

)urposel•• sne.s ot war in vie. ot nuolear weapona, the debt of
)1!ogresslve countries to underdeveloped countries, the inoreasing
ulNon,. between trade unions and management and capital, all the ••
~oyce

would regard as ooncrete instance. of bis philosophical max-

lU.

All of those, although. the7 be in the .ocial dimension, bear

~he

utmost signiftoanoe far the individual of today.

Royce's philosophy certainly bas ita faults.

Throughout

...111. paper, however, the attempt has been not to belabor the ..lork

py harping on the tallings of Roroe.

Such a negative attitude,

II think, would surelJ do inJutice to Royce in vlew of the worth~hl1"

aspects to be to'Wld 1n his philo8oplq'.

~o7C.ts

tailings vill now

bO

However, some

or

indioate4.

The first and toremost weakness, in the ovlnlon of this author, is that Royce mentioned no existential prinoiple intrinsic
to a being.

He hall nothing comparable to t he Thomistic notion of
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A beag f cr Royce i . totall,. comprehenalble 1n 1'0rmal terms.

~88..

~n

other word.,

~s

no need In human cop! tlon tor an a ct 01' judgment to posl t the

fl

being 18 .rull,. known by underatanding, and there

~lng

In exlstance.

~lng

1. real.

~xpla1n

It has alread7 .e.n that tor ROJce tormal not••

Ind1.1dua11ty, whereaa Thom1s11 would aa7, in the case of

~terlal

belng, primar.y matter 1. the principle 01' individuation.

~perlenoe,

which la tn.t cognitive aotlvlt7 prIor to underatand-

18 the prop€l1" c'op! tlonal le ••l tor ad! viduation in t he ca.e

~ng.

~t

If a purpoae 18 •••n tor a belng, then th.

human knowledge.
!lNe, fto7ce do.. aa..,. tbat tba Absolut. out 01' an Intin1 te

lumber 01' posalble world. vl1la one Into being a. hia choaen •• 11'axpre •• 1on.

However, R07ce tall. to brIq olear what 1 t 18 that

~ltte. .ntiataa
~t

an actual trom a po.alble.

the total expres.lon, vlz. tlnlte a.lve., are gi.en their real-

~t7

In that t he7 tOl'llUlll,. particIpate in the total expression.

~ll~lns

although It can be sald that the three transcendental

-

WlUll, ..erum,

~he7

In

the whol., Go4 or.at •• the partioulu.

thU.,

bou\Ull are propel' to each IndivIdual,

are meaninghl on17 1D. terma 01' operationa wl t.bin the whole.

~oaua. o~
~n

!be .peoltl0 tn.tanc.s

tbat, the individual'. value and dlgn1t7 aa a person,

ROJ'oe' 8 phI1oaopbJ', tenda to t all outsIde tbe person b.1Juelt.

, ... o_on Intepeat dictatea the personal, although, it must be
~ald,

In ROJoe'. phlloaoplq' It 1. juat a true to s.., that the o:r-

~anise4

Intereata ot IndivIdual. shape the oommon Intere.t.

It 1.
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a question ot prIority.

It seema, however, that one must inter-

pret ROTce as sa71ng that the communit7 comes tlrst, then, consequent17, comes the individual.
such a doctrine.

Many would tind no tault with

.evertheless, this author cannot acoept Royoe's

prlorltT, since he regards the Individual as tha souroe ot Identl
realltT, and goodness from which the cODlllun.1t7 takes on substance.

-

a bases his opInIon ultimate17 an the intrInsIc principle esse,
trom whioh the transcendentals are derived.

SIno. ROTce reJeota matter, he • an draw no 1'181d di.tinction
etween human persona and thing. or antmal..
thinks that he doe. get to the natures

or

However, it one ,

things and anillal. throug

their proper aocidents as theT appear both to scientifio and ordirJ observation, then he must sal' that not every b.ing is a oan-

ciou. selt in the full s.nse that man is.

But it one agrees with

070e that his knowledge does not get to a prinoiple at operation,
nature, then he must oonte.s that because ot his inadequate
things mal' to a more perceptive observtPbe conscious
all.

This author does" not agree wi th ROTce here.

ROTce's s7st. . is an endeavor to explain total17 in rational
the whole at realIty.
~~Rent

to his explanation.

be non-intelligible,

&S

fhua, all truth and a 11 being must be
His prinCiple ot individuation can_tter Is.

So, also, • ince God must

be transcendent tot he explanatIon at the s7ste., the ground
truth and bell18 must be IJIIUnent to the s7stem.

In principle,

must be comprehensIble In terms at the 87ste., and the rattanal
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system itself' nlust sa,tL3t)' all ne&ds .for an absolute.

The system

i8 the ultimate., by which everrtll1ng must be defineCi and explained
Howeyer, GoG, aa pure Act. 1s transcendent tothe finite order
ae can never be tullY determined by a human system. for man's

knowledge of Hi. is by nature limited to analogy.

God is, however

the efficient, tinal, a nd. exemplary cause of oreatures.
80

He e an bE;

regarded because He it 1s who endows cr-eatures w 1 th their

proper act of exiatence (esse).

Their .finitude gives God. a trans-

cendent status ltIhich can be approached from the human
through analogr_

O,,"L

8

tandpolnt

Insofar as a beins finitely participates by bis

determined act of existence in the Infinite Act of Existence, God

i8 immanent to oreation.

5everthele.s, in no sen.e is God the

terial or intrinsio formal cause of creatures.

That is tosay,

God is not the oreature and the creature i . not God.

Thus, He

intains a strict ontologioal transcendence, wh11e yet being in-

volved in oreation.
Also, Royce holds that all final causalIty 1s immanent to tht

Pl'actical17 speaking, such f1nalit7 does not w urk.

t\.ccord

Royc., man finds in the world the full opportunity for fulilliag his purp. . . , although an infinite ti.e is required.

The

driving toroe behind the selt-expressing is the growth in person.
he norm and. impetus tor activi'ty, then, is the activity itself.
lthougb there is samething of truth in that, the doctrine 1s inA transcendent with normatlYe ani mot!vating value is

Il'leaning to hu.men life.

otherwise, man would be oon

10$
1: tbe 11111181' prograa81(;;f\ of •• If-cievelopment, instead of in terma

t a subordinktion ot choice. in a rundamental comDdtment to a

raneeena.nt.

UltImately,.be would h6l.ve nowrutl'" to 60, unu he

ould ba in lIttle hu.r1'J' to get there.

In the concrete MOl-al alt-

tlon, when wan is 1"&084 with the option to do thl. p!I.rticular
ood in api te of personal discomfort or to take the ettortles. path
ownh111, Royce's doctrine ot an infinite .aries ot moral acta
erri•• lIttle appeal 101" tbe c&uae ot righteousne...

1118 Neon-

ll1ation in term. 01' at.mit, 18 unintelligible and eluaive to the
who aua t 11'fa IIlOrall,- 1n t 1_.
Gocl 18 manta ultbaat. tlnal cauae.

to te.pol, .. l car.. and encla.

He 1t 1. that gives mean

Union 1A Hi. g1 vee _anirlg to the

triving after good In tb1a life.

Only a tI'anacendent God. can

of th1nga i-.aflent to thls world.

fmdent Ciod, w no raises
with

bi.,

MIl

A trar.lS

to h18 t'ull perfe.tion and happines8

alone can make this te.poral17 t1n1te 11fe worth

ROloa haa tal1e4 to br1dge t he gap be tween the teapol"al and

eternal.

Neve~thele8.,

it hi. pb11oBopn, 18 to be RBanin6tul,

terapnral end eternal ordep, thouy"h diatinot, .mwst not remaIn
.elate4 tztom one another.

Begel, a180, ae" that there 18 a basic

nadequaoJ 1n a moral1 t1 wh1ch ia •• t in .. tN_work where tne

tel"'llal 1. suna.peel from t ha temporal.
talns

tt~t

11

Royce t a human1.m maln-

tne 1ndividual t s willing or hi. purt.ot1on in time 18
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iden tical ·wIth t hift Abao: ute '8 will in • tern! ty. Howe
var, since
th,. ultlm .-qte filotl ve for mora l activ ity 1s st.-It -deve
lopm ent and,
80. happln~ss. the tlll~U1IJc.ndent will oJ:
the Abso lute 18 in no way
ope~Q.tiv.

in !nunan mera lIt,._

The Abao lute, aino e n& hu set up

the idea l .aU tor eaoh 1n.dl vidu al, -7 be. aid t
0&\18 8

to%' mort ilect lvltJ , but not a tina l.

0

be an. xemp la17

The fina l oaua e 18 man'

perr .otlo n and happ in•••• whio h are 1mmanent in the
rinit e 'World
and only coin olde ntal t 0 tM Abso lute.

One obv1 0us area in ROTce's pnilo aoptl J' wh10h -1' rall unde
r
cena ure 1. hla hand line ot Nal 1...
toot .t(>lIlW6l.t'd in
the d.oct r1ne

h~ Ii

Heh ardl J puts reali sll' a beat

cont rived dialo gue.

ot Inte ntlu nalit ,.

lUiS ..

Royc e make . no 1I1ent1.on or

poas ible answ er ot l'eal lstio

.piat emo loa to hia probl em of the tota l sepu atlo n ot
subj ect
:trom obje ct. ret, t he rejec tion or real1 . . in tavel ' of idea
lism
is at the h.eat- t

partl oula rs
R07c~

&111 in hi.

tl1at

now

o~

or

Royc e's philo sopl\ Y' and slgn 1fica nt to all the

b1& philo soph izing .

hima elt doaa not prop os. a clea r epla teao lo81 , •• pecl -

!!!. Worl.d

and.

!!:!. ...IIl....d"""I....v......i...,ci....,UIl
........
l,

II. 1n i5plt e

ot tne .tact

one knows 1. a verJ impo rtant aspe ct or the human pers en.
taIls to indic a •• how, aoco rdlns to his idea llsm , communi
abou t IlDlOfli men, altlW n.lgh this 18 moat indic ative ot

n'a 8001 al natu re.

Thos e taul ts whic h bav. been toUD4 10 Royc e'. pb1108opby
are
it ••• ma , m8N l, a laok in the sena e at not matc bing
Thom

lat1e

Rath er, the7

al"8

taul t.

beca~e

ot lnau ff1cl ency 1ntev na

to his IITatem or

an ontological need

becaU3:

rOI-

EtxplEUlatlon

Wid]

ignored.

.

-

RafCB'S
II
.. PHILOSOPH!
........
As Royce

..

P~C~I~
.,

exPe~1.nc6d

TODAY.

the b~utal assassination or

President

Lincoln (Royoe was ten at the time), so too t he people of this age

have w1tneseed the cpuel na.u-der
of m1nutf). ,the &llIlOUllceruent

(I~

or

Plteslden1; Kennedy.

In a matter

Preaident !.'e_ed7'. death was sent

throusbout the nation and, tben, thNmgbout the world b7 teletype
end 1"&410.

Soon atter. tba eye. of mdl11cna saw the dread1\tl
P1gura t1 .811'

by _ana of televislon.

.p~a;"1ng,

the al'teries of'

cODlflun1cat10M have made the world a unlfied orgtlllism.

tlme .. the whole 110%'14 emerged ..II one
?~0std.ntfe

family &nd bi. country.

the world Into A.
na~w
~8l11

interests

or

eaoh

~loed ~

of plUtpoao..

At that

1 ts sympathies tor the

Grief and Indlgnation shocked

which transcended the everyday.

count~.

The strong spir1ts of nat1onal-

are now dlssolving, It seems,

~OIlUIlormeAS

~,ll

8el.r-aNare~.a

ill

ae~4

lUI

the human %tao. apprecf.ates Itll

President Kenned1' s assasainatlon was no-

all becaWllfl of the magnltude of the dlsruptlon involved;

eon.ttlered It a l'llOst he1Doua cpl...

prder vl01ent17, Md .. so .. It

IIRS

It dlatuz-be:ci the world-

regarded b;r all .. on.• viI.

So,

too, all ev11 d11lI"Upts the (]od-rlven oJ-der of the world and" more
precisel,. acta againet the natuHR

or

In41vldttala o.r, 1n Royce '.

J,erma. agalnat the IntePnal meanings of 8.,lves.
The common manl.teRtatlon of t be sympath1e. expressed at Prt.Uh..
ldent Kennedy'.

d.e~th

boom all q'W\,l'ltere or the wC',.-ld, the 01"1:"'101.1
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orgaalzatlor1s f<r world goverlUllent, the International Court of
Justice, the growing appreciation among people throughout the
tor the universal cnaraoterisrica of their tellow hu..n beallot this and more point to the taot that people are betheir unit1 in the world.

R010e would have

thi. is a major step tuward selt-development.

The purpose ot this thesis was to present Royce's notion of
Individual hu.man selt', as he sets it rorth ill the second vole of The World and the Ind.i \fidual.
______

J

n

The human

_____

8

~

.-....;..................._ _

elt acquires 1 ts Iamortal and unique Identl ty

hrough its .t"l:-ee selt-de"elop_nt in cmjtmction wi til the Absolute'
Two dlarchtal princIples,
t~

~he

ideal selt which appears in

wor-ld which appears in time, converge in the h

elf to gIve him the possIbI1it7 and direction ot bis existence
Ultimately, sinoe the world itself is an e xpl"ession ot
the two principles are redUCible to one, the Absolute'.

A prime object of attention has been to Indicate the metacontext tor R07ce's statements on the human person.

Ro~ce

mean to set up the constitution ot the human person In a

urely ,.7chologloal or logioal framework.
tat.menta be understood in
ion ot reallt,-.

te~

He wishes that his

of a fUll and ultimate explana-
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